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Abstract 
The Blue Nile Basin has for the past century been characterized by Egyptian dominance, both 
directly and through British colonial rule. This dominance is institutionalized through the 
Nile Water Agreements and the Anglo-Italian Agreement of 1902, which grant Egypt and 
Sudan the right to divide between them the entirety of the Nile, as well as the right to veto 
any construction on the river. 
This veto right and the treaties it is based on are currently being contested by the construction 
of “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam” (GERD) across the Blue Nile close to the border 
with Sudan, which openly has declared support for the project. Given the historical 
relationship between Sudan and Egypt, this is a move of no small significance. Sudan has 
historically been a staunch ally of Egypt, who in turn has largely assumed Sudanese support 
for its Nile policy by default and for the past two centuries has been working towards greater 
integration between the two countries.  
The point of departure for this study is the assumption that GERD represents not only a 
physical subversion of Egyptian dominance on the Blue Nile, but also a subversion of the 
ideas, narratives and discourses that support this dominance. Looking at the Sudanese support 
for the construction of GERD as an expression of this subversion and seeing representations 
of dominance as concrete acts either supporting or contesting that dominance, the aim of this 
study is to investigate the ideological dimension of the ongoing power shift in the Blue Nile 
basin through looking at how Egyptian and Sudanese media discourses represent Egyptian 
dominance. 
The findings, in short, are that Egyptian discourse legitimizes dominance by representing the 
basin as characterized by equality and the rule of law, with Egypt inhabiting the position of 
basin leader due to historical and geographical conditions. Sudanese discourse entails a 
limited subversion of this, contesting the Nile Water Agreements as the basis of basin 
regulation and asserting greater rights for the upstream countries to utilize the river. At the 
same time, it is found that a prescriptive idea of ‘shared interests’ remains the focus of both 
ideologies. 
A secondary aim of this study is to situate its methodology, theory and findings in relation to 
the established school of critical transboundary water studies known as hydro-hegemony. 
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Through addressing what it is argued is a lacking understanding of the nature and role of 
ideology in hydro-hegemonic theory, the aim is to provide a better foundation for further 
theoretical and empirical research on ideology both in the Blue Nile Basin and, it is hoped, in 
international river basins more generally. 
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1 Introduction 
The Blue Nile Basin is currently seeing a historic shift in power. The dominance of 
Egypt, which has lasted for the past century, is being challenged by the construction of 
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) across the Blue Nile close to the 
Ethiopian-Sudanese border. The aim of this study is to investigate the ideological 
dimension of this shift from the vantage point of Egyptian and Sudanese media 
discourse. 
In order to properly contextualize these events, we begin at the beginning: namely with 
an outline of the hydrology, geography and history of the Blue Nile basin. In other 
words, why and how Egypt has dominated the basin for the past century, and why and 
how Ethiopia and Sudan now are contesting this dominance. 
Changing Power Relations in the Blue Nile Basin 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the Nile to Sudan and Egypt. To both it is, in 
the words of Nile Historian Terje Tvedt, “the all-encompassing and decisive 
geographical factor” (Tvedt 2012:167). To both, broadly speaking, it is what makes the 
desert habitable for large sedentary settlements – sedentary being the root of the Arabic 
word for ‘civilization’. 
Few things illustrate this importance better than the contrasts in the landscape around 
Aswan. Set against the deep blue of the Nile, the brown of the city and the green on its 
banks, stand stark sand dunes. From the top of these dunes there is nothing to see but 
desert. “In order to understand what the Nile means to Egypt […]” writes Tvedt “one 
has to understand what [Egypt] would have been without the river […]” (Tvedt 
2012:20). The short answer is simply a vast empty desert. With some minor differences 
– chief among them slightly more rainfall – the same is true for Sudan. 
Located a few kilometres upstream from the city centre, the High Aswan Dam 
dominates the scenery. In the vast desert, where the sun is searing even in January, the 
water lies trapped in place by this tremendous engineering feat, which sits in the 
landscape like an artificial mountain. The dam, along with its reservoir and the treaties 
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that have made sure it is always full, are testament both to Egyptian power and 
dominance in the basin, and to Egypt’s extreme vulnerability. 
Of the water that reaches the Aswan Dam, rainfall in the Ethiopian highlands make up 
over 85 percent – through the Blue Nile and some smaller tributaries. In different terms, 
Egypt and Sudan depend on Ethiopia – and to a lesser extent Eritrea – for almost 90 
percent of their freshwater (Arsano 2010). The Blue Nile alone accounts for over 50 
percent of Egyptian and Sudanese freshwater (Elsanabary 2012). 
For most of the year it is less a river than a stream, but with the Ethiopian summer rains 
it swells to a torrent that carries with it great amounts of extremely fine mud known as 
silt. Responsible both for some of the world’s most fertile agricultural lands, and 
monumental engineering challenges and maintenance costs at Egyptian and Sudanese 
dams. In Sudan, which depends on hydropower for most of its electricity, the river 
flows through the Roseires and Sennar dams before finally joining the White Nile at 
Khartoum in what is known as the longest kiss in history. They then continue their flow 
towards Lake Nasser. 
A brief note on the geography and hydrology of Sudan, which differs significantly from 
that of Egypt. Though all of Sudan’s river are part of the Nile Basin, multiple tributaries 
make their way through the country – the most significant being the Blue Nile, the 
White Nile and the Atbara. The Blue Nile and Nile proper; and the White Nile, 
moreover, mark distinct ecosystems. The Northern and central areas, surrounding the 
former, have historically been considered to constitute part of the Nile Valley – 
alongside Egypt. The perennial White Nile, on the other hand, flows through an 
enormous and near unnavigable swamp in what is now South Sudan, known simply as 
the ‘sudd’ which translates to “barricade” or “obstruction”1. 
The foundations of current Egyptian Nile control were laid during the colonial era, 
when the British conceptualized the entire river as a means for transporting water to the 
downstream irrigation economies – namely Egypt and the Northern parts of Sudan 
(Tvedt 2006). This conceptualization of the river was enshrined in two colonial-era 
                                                 
1 The root of this Arabic word is the same as the one for dam, ‘sadd’. 
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treaties – the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1902, and the Nile Water Agreement of 
1929 – still claimed by Egypt as the foundation of basin law (Taha 2010). 
According to the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1902, Ethiopia is not permitted to 
barrage the flow of any of the Nile’s tributaries except in the agreement with Sudan and 
London (Tvedt 2006). The relevance of this agreement as a basis for contesting the 
construction of GERD is questionable given the increasingly clear Sudanese declaration 
of support for the project. 
The Nile Water Agreement of 1929 between Egypt and Great Britain – although 
increasingly contested by the upstream countries – still resides at the core of Egyptian 
policy in the Nile basin. Despite the fact that no other Nile countries were party to it, the 
agreement purported to provide a legal foundation for the allocation of the full flow of 
the Nile – and moreover, asserted that Egypt has a veto right on all construction across 
the river or any of its tributaries that could jeopardize the interest of Egypt (Tvedt 
2006:145).  
When both Sudan and Egypt had obtained independence, they entered into a new 
agreement on the Nile, entitled “The Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile 
Waters”2. The average annual flow of the river was estimated to 84bn cubic metres, 
from which 10bn cubic metres were subtracted due to evaporation from the High Aswan 
Dam reservoir. Of the remaining amount, 55.5bn cubic metres were allocated to Egypt, 
and 18.5bn cubic metres to Sudan (1959) (Taha 2010). 
It is in this geographical and institutional context Ethiopia in 2011 began construction of 
the GERD across the Blue Nile close to its border with Sudan. GERD, reported to be 
almost half-way complete (Peppeh 2015), is an immense project, part of the largest 
hydropower scheme in Africa. Upon completion its reservoir will have a total capacity 
of 63bn cubic metres (Salini Impregilo 2015), exceeding the average annual flow of the 
Blue Nile, estimated at around 48bn cubic metres (FAONILE 2008). 
Of arguably equal significance to GERD with regards to the changing power relations in 
the Blue Nile basin is the increasingly clear Sudanese support for the construction of 
                                                 
2 Link to the treaty text: http://sitemaker.umich.edu/drwcasebook/files/1959_nile_treaty.pdf. 
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GERD. This is a major historical shift. Sudan has long been a staunch ally of Egypt, 
which historically has campaigned for increased integration between the two, and 
largely has taken Sudanese support for its Nile policy for granted. 
The integration or union between Egypt and Sudan has long been popular in both 
countries, and was an explicit aim in Egyptian foreign policy prior to and during the 
British colonial era (Tvedt 2012). Sudan was conquered by Muhammad Ali in 1820 and 
ruled as part of Egypt until the Mahdi revolt in the 1880s. Shortly after, the British re-
conquered it in the name of Egypt although it was ruled by London – primarily as a 
means to the two-fold aim of increasing Egyptian water allocations; and of asserting 
control over Egypt through the use of the Nile. Since Sudanese independence in 1956 
there have continued to be periodic calls for integration from both sides (Taha 2010). 
The close cooperation between the countries resulted in the Nile Water Agreement of 
1959, and in their joint opposition to the Entebbe Agreement, a new legal framework set 
to substitute the two Nile Water Agreements as the foundation of basin regulation. As 
we have seen, the Nile Water Agreements are primarily expressions of Egyptian 
interests in the basin – allocating Egypt 55.5bn cubic metres from a total of 74bn cubic 
metres, and asserting Egyptian veto rights on all construction across the river. 
Accordingly, Sudanese support for GERD is – as we shall see – framed in a call for 
increased Sudanese influence in the basin. 
Pains have been taken by Ethiopia to emphasize that GERD’s only objective is power 
generation – not irrigation of agricultural lands – but Egypt has remained unconvinced. 
Even if this is true, the argument goes, the flow to Egypt would be reduced while the 
reservoir is being filled – a period which may take up to 7 years (International Rivers 
2014) – and more frightening still, the dam may allegedly not be up to adequate 
engineering standards in the case of an earthquake (al-Qawsy 2014, Reslan 2014b). As 
we shall see later, the potentiality that Ethiopia may use the dam to leverage its regional 
policy and/or cut off the Nile flow is also a significant worry in Egypt. 
Egypt has remained similarly unconvinced of the Sudanese assurances that the dam is 
well-planned, well-researched, and likely to benefit Egypt as well as Ethiopia and 
Sudan – and that Sudan in any case would not support its construction if it were likely 
to cause Egypt harm. 
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At the same time, GERD’s reported benefits are many. Storing the water in temperate 
highlands rather than in a desert would reduce evaporation greatly. For Sudan the 
annual Blue Nile floods would be better regulated by a large upstream dam, and the 
maintenance costs on its own dams would decrease due to the reduced silt-flow. 
Ethiopia is in great need of electricity, and GERD would make a vital contribution. So 
large, in fact, that Ethiopia is claiming it would be able to sell excess electricity to 
Sudan, and even to Egypt – both in need. 
According to this argument, as we shall see, the dam might even be a catalyst for 
increased regional cooperation: a shared electricity grid would need to be built, and a 
dam authority would need to be agreed upon that suits all three countries. In the long 
run, such cooperation might lead to increased cooperation in the Nile Basin as a whole. 
The Social Dimension of the Nile 
The problem with assessing the claims and counter-claims made by Egypt, Sudan and 
Ethiopia is of course that they are politically motivated statements rather than objective 
assessments of hydrological or engineering facts. Whether or not GERD actually is 
unsafe in the case of an earthquake, Egypt most certainly serves its own political agenda 
when claiming that it is. On the flip-side, Sudan is acting in its own interests when it 
claims that GERD is well planned, well executed and an opportunity for further 
cooperation in the basin. 
This study’s theoretical point of departure is the assertion that the Blue Nile – like other 
rivers – has a social dimension as well as a physical dimension. Hydrologically it is at 
the most fundamental level large volumes of water moving through a specific 
landscape. As mentioned, the water carries large amounts of silt due to the landscape’s 
composition, and it floods and recedes at regular intervals corresponding to annual 
rainfall in the Ethiopian highlands. 
At the same time, the Blue Nile cannot be understood only as a physical phenomenon 
because it flows through three countries with a combined population of almost 200 
million people. To all of these, the river means something. To millions upon millions of 
people it is their livelihood, their drinking water, the landscape of their daily-lives, their 
source of light, heating or cooling, and electricity for their cell phones, computers and 
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televisions. It lies at the centre of political, social and economic life, as it has done for 
millennia. 
In other words, the Nile is more than just a collection of hydrological facts and figures, 
just as dams are more than engineering schematics and flow-rates, and societies are 
more than numbered populations with certain statistical properties. Different Nile 
societies engage with the river in different ways and tell themselves and others different 
narratives, part of different histories of what the Nile is and how they and others relate 
to it. These histories in turn relate to different ideas and knowledges, which define the 
river and its relation to those who live on or near it. 
Crucially, the social dimension of the river is inextricably tied to its physical or 
hydrological dimension. In a number of historical studies, it has been shown to be no 
coincidence that the states which have assumed control over the river are extremely arid 
downstream countries (see for example Tvedt 2006, Taha 2010 and Elemam 2010). 
Egypt and Sudan have throughout their history been those who most rely on the river – 
unlike Ethiopia, temperate and rich in rain, they have always had everything to gain and 
everything to lose from how they interact with the Nile. 
Egypt’s unique position has given birth to a powerful and vital impetus to control the 
river – both on the part of various Egyptian rulers and governments and on the part of 
the colonizing British. Thus the social river is married to the physical river and should 
be understood as an extension of this. The river shapes and affects human societies, 
which in turn seek to shape and affect the river. 
The social dimension of the river – the narratives, histories, ideas and knowledges 
surrounding how different countries interact with the Nile and each other – is expressed 
through discourse. Seeing the conflict between Egypt and Sudan over the construction 
of GERD as an expression of the ongoing power shift in the basin, the ambition of the 
current study is to look at how the Egyptian and Sudanese media discourses represent 
this shift. 
Because discourse is not neutral or objective, however, but rather deliberately 
constructed and shaped by concrete agents for specific purposes, it is not sufficient for 
this study to take the discourse at face value. A critical analysis is needed to peer 
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through the different discourses, knowledges and narratives presented and identify the 
ideas and agendas behind them. Moreover, because Egyptian dominance and the 
Sudanese subversion of this dominance are based respectively in Egyptian and 
Sudanese histories of the Blue Nile, this must also be a study of history. In other words, 
a critical diachronic approach to discourse is needed. Without such an approach, the 
risk is reifying either this discourse or that, inadvertently supporting whichever 
discourse appears dominant. 
Ideology is chosen as this critical diachronic perspective, defined by the Oxford 
Dictionaries as “a system of ideas and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of 
economic or political theory and policy” (Oxford Dictionaries 2015b). This choice is 
made on the assumption that socio-political interaction in the Blue Nile Basin is 
governed not only by scientific fact, but also by ideas representing the world in specific 
ways; and by ideals specifying goals for such interaction – both historically determined. 
Given prevailing constructivist perspectives in the social sciences, such an assumption 
is not controversial. Moreover, as we shall see in the following section, it is widely 
supported in the established theory concerning river basin interaction. 
The study employs a methodological framework that allows for the understanding of 
ideology as a functional socio-political construct serving the interests of specific groups 
respectively seeking either to sustain or subvert structures of domination – in other 
words, seeing representations of dominance as concrete acts either supporting or 
contesting that dominance. The aim of the current study, then, is to investigate the 
ideological dimension of the ongoing power shift in the Blue Nile basin through looking 
at how respectively Egyptian and Sudanese media discourses represent Egyptian 
dominance. 
Accordingly, the main research questions of this study are: 
1. How does ideology in Egyptian media discourse represent Egyptian dominance 
in the Blue Nile basin? 
2. How does ideology in Sudanese media discourse represent Egyptian dominance 
in the Blue Nile Basin, and to which extent is this representation a subversion of 
that dominance? 
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A grasp of the historical and socio-political origins of the ideas and ideals that Egyptian 
and Sudanese theories and policies in the Blue Nile Basin are founded in is, it is argued, 
of great importance to the understanding of these theories and policies. A 
comprehensive understanding of the theories and policies underlying basin interaction 
is, in turn, useful from the perspective of working towards and encouraging sustainable, 
equitable and effective frameworks and institutions for regulation in the basin. 
In short, this study finds that the prevailing representation in Egyptian ideology is of 
Egyptian dominance not only as legitimate, but as natural. More specifically, the Nile 
Water Agreements are framed as representations of the natural order in the basin, 
whereby Egyptian leadership is a product of the basin’s historical and ecological 
characteristics. 
Egyptian dominance is founded in an absolute principle of historical rights. According 
to this principle, Egypt was the earliest civilization to settle in the Nile Basin, and the 
first to develop irrigation due to incontrovertible geographical and hydrological 
conditions. Loosely based in the legal principle of easement3 and combined with a 
supreme conviction of Egyptian benevolence, capacity and superior scientific 
understanding, this is used to assert an Egyptian ideological position as a first among 
equals and natural leader guaranteeing shared benefit for all basin countries. 
This view of the Blue Nile Basin is to a limited extent subverted in Sudanese ideology, 
which paints Egypt not as the first among equals – but rather as a coercive, self-
interested and exploitative power skilled at deploying discourse and knowledge to 
support its own interests while denying others any support for their interests. 
Accordingly, the Sudanese discourse contests the Nile Water Agreements as the 
foundation of Nile regulation due to their colonial origins, and contends that while 
shared benefit should remain the goal, this should rather be founded in a more inclusive 
and egalitarian legal framework. 
Significantly, the Sudanese support for GERD is in the Sudanese media framed as a 
realization of the fact that the geographical and hydrological position of Sudan differs 
                                                 
3 Easement, in this context, is the legal right to use a river despite its origin in another states land (Abdelhameed 
2014). 
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significantly from that of Egypt – meaning that an upstream dam on the Blue Nile 
would bring concrete and tangible benefits, as outlined above. The prevailing ideology 
in the Sudanese discourse covered by this study appears to have seized upon GERD as 
an opportunity to contest post-colonial Egyptian Nile policy. Calling for a less 
authoritarian basin-regime, with more influence for itself and the other upstream 
nations. 
In short, while a physical subversion of the river’s role (GERD) lies at the heart of the 
current contestation of Egyptian dominance in the Blue Nile Basin, this appears to also 
be a subversion of the narrative, knowledge and ideology on which Egyptian dominance 
is founded and by which it is legitimized. The Nile envisioned by Ethiopia and Sudan 
does not appear to exist primarily for the benefit of the downstream countries, 
contesting the principles according to which the river has been governed for the past 
century. 
I am aware of the limitations of this study, but I also consider them fully acceptable and 
justifiable. Firstly, this study focuses on the dominant state ideologies in Egypt and the 
Sudan. This decision is made primarily due to limitations in time and scope. More 
research on Ethiopian ideology and discourse in the Blue Nile Basin is needed; as is 
more research on the prevalent non-state ideologies in the Blue Nile countries. 
Secondly, it bears repeating that this study only focuses on one, albeit very important 
aspect of transboundary river-interaction: namely ideology. The method used is social 
semiotic discourse analysis, and the sources are a selection of Egyptian and Sudanese 
newspaper articles. More research is needed to identify the way ideology interacts with 
the world outside political discourse. 
As established above, there are different ways of understanding the Nile. The dominant 
one from a modern European point of view is the downstream perspective whereby it is 
all one river whose main purpose is providing water for irrigation in Egypt and Sudan. 
This is the contemporary perspective of Egypt, the long-time hegemon of the basin. 
In other words, this means that the historical narrative and ideological perspective of 
Egypt holds a privileged position both in the Basin (Tvedt 2006, Zeitoun, et al. 2014), 
and in the European imagination (Tvedt 2006). It is therefore important for me to 
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plainly state that I am a European and a long-time resident of Cairo, and it is crucial to 
examine my own prejudice in order to avoid inadvertently supporting that which 
appears dominant or ideologically preferable. 
While my personal and academic backgrounds lie in Norway and Egypt, my ideological 
convictions tend to favour the dominated and marginalized. This is not to say that a 
political or ideological programme lies behind this thesis, but rather to openly declare 
my ideological and academic leanings. Firstly, to aid me in addressing and 
compensating for these, and secondly so that they are clear to the reader. 
Theoretical Perspectives on Ideology in 
International River Basins 
The existence and significance of a social dimension in international river basins is not, 
in itself, a novel theoretical observation. The prominent school of critical water 
interaction studies known as hydro-hegemony posits ideology and discourse as the 
centrepieces of a theoretical framework aimed at the comprehensive inter-disciplinary 
study of power and state interaction in international river basins. 
While it proposes the ways in which these concepts relate to larger power structures, 
however, hydro-hegemony does not feature a methodological framework for the study 
of ideology and discourse in their own right. A crucial failing, it is argued, given the 
emphasis placed on these as determinants of basin interaction. Nevertheless, there is 
clear utility in drawing some parallels between the methodological framework used by 
the current study, and the theoretical framework of hydro-hegemony. 
Despite its flaws, it is argued that hydro-hegemony constitutes an important theoretical 
basis for the comprehensive and inter-disciplinary study of power and state interaction 
in international river basins. It is difficult to overstate the importance of such an inter-
disciplinary approach to river basin interaction as a building block of ongoing efforts to 
understand state interaction in the Blue Nile Basin, and to design political and legal 
regimes and institutions for the sustainable, equitable and effective regulation of the 
basin. 
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Therefore, a secondary goal of this study is to situate its methodology, theory and 
findings in relation to the larger academic context of hydro-hegemony. This serves two 
important purposes: firstly it allows the current study to more easily draw from the 
theoretical insights of this framework regarding the nature of inter-state river basin 
interaction; and secondly, by combining the theoretical-methodological insights of the 
current study, and the theoretical insights of hydro-hegemony a better foundation may 
be provided for further empirical and theoretical research on the role of ideology both in 
the Blue Nile Basin and, it is hoped, in international river basins more generally. 
In other words, there are two concrete aims for connecting the social semiotics of 
Hodge & Kress and hydro-hegemony: firstly, addressing, the lacking hydro-hegemonic 
methodology for the analysis of discourse and ideology; and secondly, addressing the 
generalized nature of the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress, which provides no 
theoretical-methodological framework for the study of how ideology relates to state 
interaction in the Blue Nile Basin outside the important albeit limited field of discourse. 
In the interest of addressing these issues, the following secondary research question will 
be treated separately in chapter four: 
3. How can the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress contribute to a deeper and 
broader understanding of the role of ideology and discourse in the theoretical 
framework of hydro-hegemony? 
While a comprehensive discussion of this study’s findings as they relate to the concept 
of ideology in hydro-hegemony is given in chapter four, a brief introduction is given 
here, to enable the preceding chapters to draw on some useful theoretical perspectives. 
Fundamental to the hydro-hegemonic understanding of power and state interaction in 
international river basins are two related ideas: firstly, that transboundary river basins 
are characterized by power asymmetries; and secondly that different forms of power are 
active in transboundary river basins. 
Hydro-hegemony lies at the intersection of these ideas – a position of superior capacity 
for basin control, which draws on what Zeitoun et.al. call “subtle” mechanisms of 
power. These differ from overtly coercive power mechanisms such as military force or 
threats of military force, and relate primarily to ideology and normative frameworks, 
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and the capacity to construct and/or impose visions, agendas, discourses, realities, 
knowledges (Zeitoun, et al. 2014). In short the capacity to set and control the rules of 
the game. 
The non-hegemonic states, meanwhile, are engaged in a struggle to resist or contest the 
hegemonic order – with the ultimate goal of transforming it “through the direct or 
indirect undermining of the foundations that underpin it” (Zeitoun, et al. 2014:3). Put in 
different terms, the non-hegemonic states work to subvert the hegemonic order. 
In order to achieve this goal, the mechanisms they have at their disposal – like those of 
the hegemon – range from coercive to subtle power. Zeitoun et.al. theorize that just as 
the successful hegemon draws on subtle or ideological mechanisms, so the successful 
counter-hegemon must draw on similar subtle or ideological mechanisms.  
Briefly, the currents study suggests – although additional research is needed – that a key 
flaw resulting from the inadequate methodological approach to ideology in hydro-
hegemony is an overly compartmentalized understanding of the role and nature of 
ideology and discourse, whereby their impact is limited to more or less effective so-
called subtle mechanisms. 
On the basis of its findings, this study proposes that the social semiotics of Hodge & 
Kress provide a theoretical-methodological base with the potential to broaden and 
deepen the understanding of the role of ideology and discourse in hydro-hegemonic 
theory. 
Finally, a brief note on language: while ‘dominance’ in hydro-hegemony is related to 
coercive or non-subtle mechanisms of power and thus differs from hegemony as a less 
effective means of control, this study uses the common dictionary definition – as it is 
also understood by the theoretical-methodological approach of this study. The Oxford 
Dictionaries define dominance as “power and influence over others” (Oxford 
Dictionaries 2015a). Because the current study’s analytical approach addresses 
precisely the ‘subtle’ mechanisms of power, these two terms (dominance and 
hegemony) are in this study treated as synonymous. 
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Methodology 
As we have seen above, the doctrine of absolute historical rights is presented to the 
reader of the Egyptian newspapers studied as fact. As sure as the Nile flows from South 
to North, Egypt is the natural and indisputable leader of the basin. To the reader of the 
Sudanese newspapers in question, Egyptian exploitation and coercion is similarly 
presented as fact. Therefore, as established above, a critical diachronic approach to 
discourse in the Blue Nile Basin is needed. 
Ideology, defined by the Oxford Dictionaries as “a system of ideas and ideals, 
especially one which forms the basis of economic or political theory and policy” 
(Oxford Dictionaries 2015b), has been chosen as the critical perspective of this study on 
the assumption that discourse, knowledge and policy are conditioned by such a system. 
This assumption is implicit in the general definition of ideology, and is as mentioned 
above not considered to be controversial. 
More specifically, the methodology of this study is based in the social semiotics of 
Hodge & Kress. Semiotics fundamentally has to do with meaning, and social semiotics 
emphasizes the social dimension of meaning – meaning as socially constructed or 
negotiated. 
While there are a multitude of critical approaches to discourse analysis, the social 
semiotics of Hodge & Kress is considered particularly appropriate to the current study 
due to its explicit understanding of meaning as a representation of the world, 
conditioned by ideas and ideals (ideology); its express emphasis on socio-political 
interaction as a key determinant of meaning; and its orientation to ideology as directly 
related to questions of power, dominance and the subversion of dominance. The above 
has clear utility given the stated aim of investigating the ideological dimension of the 
ongoing power shift in the Blue Nile basin through looking at how respectively 
Egyptian and Sudanese media discourses represent Egyptian dominance. 
The reason Hodge & Kress have been chosen instead of other prominent semioticians 
such as Foucault, is their explicit treatment of solidarity alongside power as a 
determinant of socio-political interaction. The significance of solidarity has been an 
important issue in general and global debates on conditions for cooperation in 
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international river basins, and the term is also used due to its importance in the 
ideologies of the Blue Nile basin more specifically. 
Hodge & Kress found their analytical framework on the Marxian concept of ideology, 
taking as their point of departure the following formulation:  
Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active 
men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive 
forces, and of the intercourse corresponding to these up to its furthest forms. 
Consciousness (das Bewusstsein) can never be anything else than conscious 
being (das bewusste Sein), and the being of men is their actual life-process. 
If in all ideology men and their relations appear upside down as in a camera 
obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-
process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-
process (Hodge and Kress 1988:2). 
In short, ideology is understood a historically determined image of the world. Like a 
picture taken by a camera, however, it is not an objective depiction of the world, but 
depends on the choice of perspective, the focus of the shot, the type of camera and film 
(or filters), lighting and much more. In the Blue Nile Basin, Egypt and Sudan are both 
proponents of different ideologies, that is, of images of what the world is and should be 
– ideas and ideals. 
These images are expressed through Discourse, understood as “the social process in 
which texts are embedded” (Hodge and Kress 1988:6). A text is understood in the broad 
sense as “a structure of messages (…) which has a socially ascribed unity” (Hodge and 
Kress 1988:6). A message, Hodge & Kress write: “[is] the smallest semiotic form that 
has concrete existence (…). The message has directionality – it has a source, a social 
context and a purpose (…)” (Hodge and Kress 1988:5). 
Messages link both producers and receivers; and signifiers and signifieds. Crucially, in 
linking signifiers and signifieds they refer to a world outside the text, implying some 
idea of reality. As already established, a point of departure in this thesis is that the social 
dimension of the Blue Nile should be seen as a concrete extension of the physical river. 
Messages, in turn, are composed of signs. A sign is in semiotics defined as something 
that stands for something other than itself (Chandler 2007:260). In other words, signs 
are things which mean or represent something. The distinction between a sign and its 
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meaning lies at the heart of semiotics. In classical Saussurean semiotics, the form of the 
sign is referred to as the signifier, whereas its meaning is referred to as the signified: 
“the signifier is the carrier of meaning, whereas the signified is the concept or meaning” 
(Hodge and Kress 1988:17). In other words, the signifier is what is perceived (seen, 
heard, etc.), whereas the signified is the meaning this has. 
An example of a sign is ‘equal’, this has no meaning in and of itself – it is perfectly 
possible to imagine this sequence of letters standing for any conceivable thing – it only 
gains meaning when “someone invests [it] with meaning with reference to a recognized 
code [see below]” (Chandler 2007:260). An example of a message is ‘all Nile basin 
states have equal rights to benefit from the Nile waters’. This message ties together both 
its producers and receivers; and signifiers and signifieds in specific ways: 
Firstly, as we shall see below, this message has in various forms been published both in 
Egyptian and Sudanese government newspapers. This is to say that it purports to be a 
formal and factual view of the situation and that the text has an institutionalized 
legitimacy and authority. A private citizen is not free to participate in the composition 
of this text, and a text in disagreement with it would need to fulfil certain requirements 
pertaining to style and content in order to be published in the same papers. 
Secondly, a key sign in this message is ‘equal rights’. The meaning of this is not 
necessarily clear, and differs depending on the point of view. As we shall see, Egypt 
bases its interpretation of ‘equal rights’ in the Nile Water Agreements, contending, 
among other things, that the water scarcity of Egypt and Sudan means they have greater 
need for Nile water than the upstream countries. Sudan on the other hand contests these 
agreements on the basis that they are colonial treaties and privilege Egypt above the 
other basin states. Contending that ‘equal rights’ should be based in a more inclusive 
and equitable legal framework with greater rights for upstream countries. 
In other words, the Egyptian and Sudanese ideologies feature specific codes, according 
to which the signifiers and signifieds discussed above are correlated in different ways. 
Put differently, codes “provide a framework within which signs make sense” (Chandler 
2007:245). 
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Crucially in the context of language, codes are social conventions – they are constructed 
by and negotiated between social groups and/or individuals. The fact that codes are 
social means that they are inherently contested, signs and messages can and do mean 
different things to different people and different groups. 
The fact that meaning is socially constructed and negotiated is precisely the reason the 
Nile cannot be studied simply as a collection of physical properties – it means or 
represents something to all who interact with it or think about it, and it represents 
different things to different people. 
In a social context, meaning is always expressed from a specific point of view, which is 
to say that it always represents the world in a specific way as perceived by whomever 
holds this point of view – organizing the producer and recipient; and signifiers and 
signifieds in specific ways. This depiction of the world is ideology, a specific point of 
view held by a concrete social agent which, according to Hodge & Kress serves a 
specific purpose either for those seeking to impose dominance, or for those seeking to 
subvert dominance. 
This representation of the world – ideology – is according to Hodge & Kress an 
expression of bonds of power and solidarity. Power broadly denoting hierarchy, control, 
order; and solidarity broadly denoting unity, cohesion. To describe the inherent 
contradiction between power and solidarity as determinants of ideology, Hodge & Kress 
use the term ideological complex, An Ideological Complex is thus: 
a functionally related set of contradictory versions of the world, coercively 
imposed by one social group on another on behalf of its own distinctive 
interests or subversively offered by another social group in attempts at 
resistance in its own interests. An ideological complex exists to sustain 
relationships of both power and solidarity, and it represents both the 
dominant and the subordinate (Hodge and Kress 1988:3). 
Power and solidarity coexist because power on its own is very ineffective in sustaining 
and legitimizing dominance: 
In order to sustain the structures of domination the dominant groups attempt 
to represent the world in forms that reflect their own interests, the interests 
of their power. But they also need to sustain the bonds of solidarity that are 
the condition of their dominance. (Hodge and Kress 1988:3).  
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In the above statement about equal rights, the Nile Basin is tied together not only by 
geography and the Nile as a shared water resource, but also by the apparently common 
pursuit of development. Yet while asserting solidarity, both the Egyptian and Sudanese 
ideologies at the same time assert power. Egypt by privileging Egyptian rights to Nile 
water; and Sudan through asserting greater influence in the basin for upstream 
countries. 
The reason these ideological complexes can function despite the inherent contradiction 
between power and solidarity is what Hodge & Kress call logonomic systems: namely 
codes or rules “prescribing the conditions for production and reception of meanings” 
(Hodge and Kress 1988:4). Logonomic systems “prescribe social semiotic behaviors at 
points of production and reception (…)” (Hodge and Kress 1988:4) thus regulating how 
messages can be constructed and how they can be received. 
In both Egypt and Sudan, the state information services and state media are owned and 
controlled by the government, and run by those loyal to it. Similarly, many of the 
purportedly independent newspapers, as we shall see in the next section, have 
connections to the government. Accordingly, an article or opinion must fulfil certain 
requirements in order to be considered legitimate and be published by these institutions 
– these requirements are part of the logonomic system supporting the dominant 
ideological complex. 
Sources 
The object of study in this thesis is media discourse. A range of articles have been 
chosen from a selection of the most prominent Arabic-language newspapers in Sudan 
and Egypt to reflect the prevalent ideologies in the respective media discourses – with a 
focus on state discourse. The choice of newspapers over interviews has been made 
because they give a more official view and allow for a larger extent of inter-subjectivity, 
which is crucial given that the topic of study is highly conflictual. Because several of 
the newspapers used are either directly controlled by the respective governments or 
have strong ties to them, moreover, they are valuable sources of government discourse. 
Accordingly, the selection has been made according to three criteria: to capture the 
government views; circulation; and to capture prevalent non-government views. The 
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following newspapers have been chosen, respectively from Egypt and Sudan: al-Ahram, 
al-Masry al-Youm, al-Shorouq; al-Intibaha, Akher Lahza, al-Midan. 
The articles have been selected with an emphasis on editorials, and opinion-pieces by 
government officials and other prominent members of the public sphere. Articles have 
been chosen from the online archives of the respective newspapers in a period of 
approximately one year from spring 2013 to spring 2014. It was crucial to choose a 
period that covered the transition period from President Morsi to President Sisi in 
Egypt, as well as the increasingly clear Sudanese support for GERD and closer 
cooperation with Ethiopia. Below follows a profile of the selected media. 
Finally, a couple of notes. Page numbers are not used when quoting from newspaper 
articles, as these rarely exceed two pages. In cases where there are five or more citations 
listed in one place, these have been placed in footnotes. 
All translations are my own, with the assistance of the Wehr Dictionary of Modern 
Written Arabic (Wehr 1994). The original Arabic text of quotes is provided in 
footnotes. 
Egypt 
At the end of the Mubarak era Egyptian media was, according to Professor of Media 
Studies Kai Hafez, characterized by increased media-freedom and tolerance for plurality 
and criticism: 
Over the last sixty years since the revolution of 1952, Egypt has experienced 
a clear long-term trend towards increased media freedom from the 
presidency of Gamal Abd el-Nasser to the military coup of July 2013. The 
late years of  Husni Mubarak can by and large be labelled as a “liberal 
autocracy”, in which it was possible to criticize the government although 
many red lines were not to be crossed (Hafez 2015:9).  
Notably, the two private newspapers used as sources in this thesis (al-Masry al-Youm 
and al-Shorouq) were both founded in the late Mubarak period. According to Edward 
Webb, however, they “mostly reflected the agendas of their owners, who were never too 
far outside the Mubarak circle” (Webb 2014:35) In the immediate aftermath of the 25th 
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of January popular uprising, this process of increased media freedom seemed to be 
continuing. 
After the 2013 popular uprising-cum-coup, the military took control of the government, 
and one of their first actions was to close all media they claimed were Islamist, 
including the Egyptian bureau of prominent international broadcaster Aljazeera, 
according to Hafez “ending the phase of pluralism in the Egyptian media system” 
(2015:13). The current situation is summed up by Professor of Journalism and Mass 
Communication Rasha Abdulla in the following way: 
Successive Egyptian regimes following the revolution have taken steps to 
limit freedom of expression and control the narrative in Egyptian media 
coverage. Hopes for a more professional media sector have been dashed by 
a state media apparatus that has for all intents and purposes supported 
whatever regime is in power, private media outlets influenced by wealthy 
owners with ties to the Mubarak regime, and severe polarization between 
Islamist and non-Islamist outlets. (…) It has become increasingly difficult 
to air or publish voices that are not in total harmony with pro-regime 
propaganda. Indeed, several private, supposedly independent newspapers 
have refused to publish pieces by contributors that failed to follow the 
editorial line. Generally speaking, the media in Egypt are currently 
characterized by their seemingly unanimous support for the regime and an 
inflated portrayal of high hopes for the new president (Abdulla 2014:27). 
Al-Ahram 
Al-Ahram was founded in 1875, and has the largest circulation of any daily Egyptian 
newspaper. It is owned and controlled by the Egyptian Government, which controls 
appointments to key positions and bodies, including the appointment of editors-in-chief 
(El Shaer 2015). Moreover, most private newspapers – with the notable exception of al-
Masry al-Youm – rely on the printing and distribution services of al-Ahram and the 
other state newspapers (UNESCO 2013). 
Al-Masry al-Youm 
Founded in 2004, al-Masry al-Youm is privately owned and has one of the largest 
circulations in Egypt (Caryle 2012), as well as a popular website. It has its own printing 
press, and briefly overtook the circulation of al-Ahram during the 2011 protests 
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(UNESCO 2013). It is partly owned by prominent Egyptian businessman Naguib 
Sawiris, and has strong ties to the Sawiris family. This has according to Professor 
Edward Webb been reflected in the coverage of the paper: “the issue was not one of the 
state censoring content, but of the owners, all major businesspeople, having their own 
agenda, which much of the time did not conflict with Gamal Mubarak’s planned 
succession to the presidency” (Webb 2014:36). It featured an English-language sister-
publication which was hailed by the Columbia Journalism Review as “a symbol of 
Egypt’s new freedom of press” (Salama 2013), however this was closed in 2013 
allegedly due to financial trouble. 
Al-Shorouq4 
Founded in 2009, al-Shorouq is privately owned by the Shorouq publishing house, and 
while the print edition has a significantly smaller circulation than al-Masry al-Youm 
and al-Ahram, its online edition is widely read (Messieh 2012). It has a reputation for 
being somewhat more critical of the regime than al-Masry al-Youm and to have good 
relationship with elite circles at the American University in Cairo (Webb 2014). It has 
also featured a variety of contributors including avowed Islamist Fahmy Howeidy and 
liberal Amr Hamzawi, and has published op-eds by satirical broadcaster Bassem 
Youssef. At the same time is has a history of exerting pressure on those who go too far 
(Salah 2014). 
Sudan 
The below information is based on a 2012 report on Sudanese media from Media in 
Cooperation and Transition (MiCT 2012), a German non-profit organization which 
works with media research and monitoring. This report is a well-researched and 
authoritative account of the Sudanese media landscape, ameliorating the scarcity of 
other sources. 
                                                 
4 The articles from al-Shorouq covered by this study are from the print edition. All previous editions can however be 
found in online archives, available at http://www.shorouknews.com/pdf/. 
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Since the military coup in 1989 which saw President Omar Bashir take power, media 
Scholar Roman Deckert writes that the Sudanese press has seen a careful opening and 
liberalization: 
It seems as though the government of Bashir’s National Congress Party 
(NCP) learnt from the lessons of past regimes which had suppressed press 
freedoms to such a degree that public discontent resulted in their overthrow 
through popular uprisings (MiCT 2012:14). 
More generally, Deckert summarizes the recent historical developments in Sudanese 
newspapers in the following way: 
The factionalism of party-owned and part-affiliated newspapers has always 
been the main feature of the Sudanese press with its elitist focus on 
Khartoum affairs. Due to financial pressures, most newspapers increasingly 
served as in-house tools for the parties in power. (…) Only few papers could 
be considered as striving for objectivity at times (MiCT 2012:15). 
Compared with Egypt, contemporary Sudanese newspapers have much smaller 
circulations. All the ones covered here number in the tens of thousands in a country of 
over 35 million. It is however estimated by MiCT that each copy is read by up to ten 
people. 
Deckert summarizes the current state of the Sudanese press as: “a diverse range of 
papers for a narrow spectrum of society” (MiCT 2012:16). All the major newspapers 
are published in the capital Khartoum, and due to financial and logistical limitations are 
distributed only here and in a handful of other urban centres. 
Sudanese press is nevertheless “fairly diverse”, despite its elitism and strong 
centralization. At the same time, suppression and crack-downs both by the National 
Congress Party (NCP), and the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) 
regularly take place. 
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Al-Intibaha5 
Al-Intibaha was launched in 2006, and with a circulation of 60,000 is by far the most 
widely circulated newspaper in Sudan. It is also the most visited online news site. It is 
controlled by the Islamist Just Peace Forum Party (JFP) and was founded by its head, 
who is the uncle of President al-Bashir. The JFP “is a radically Islamist and increasingly 
autonomous splinter party of the ruling NCP” (MiCT 2012:43). The paper’s columnists 
include members of President Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP). 
Akher Lahza 
Akher Lahza was founded in 2005 and is controlled by the National Intelligence and 
Security Services (NISS). It is loyal to the Sudanese Government, and has a circulation 
of about 20,000. It has ties to the Islamist movement (see above). 
Al-Midan 
al-Midan is controlled by the opposition Communist Party of Sudan and has a 
circulation of around 10,000. It was founded in 1954 and has suffered a long history of 
bans and re-openings. It vocally and aggressively opposes the government of President 
Bashir, and is regularly confiscated by the security authorities. Associate Professor at 
the University of Oslo Albrech Hofheinz (Hofheinz 2015) reports that its circle of 
readership is wider than the newspapers ideological background, including not only 
communists but also other regime-critics. 
                                                 
5 While the articles from al-Intibaha were sourced from the paper’s website, some of the links no longer appear to 
work. Copies of these articles can be provided upon request from knutmn@gmail.com. 
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2 Historical Context 
The contemporary political and ideological events in the Blue Nile Basin do not exist in 
a vacuum, but should be seen as part of continuous historical processes. As we have 
seen above, this is made explicit by Hodge & Kress, who contend that ideology is a 
historically determined image of the world. 
What follows is a brief account of the modern history the Blue Nile Basin, beginning 
with the British occupation of Egypt and Sudan and ending in the post-colonial era. This 
period is the focus because it was decisive in shaping the Nile Basin in the modern era, 
seeing the establishment of infrastructure which has altered the physical characteristics 
of the river, and treaties which have altered how the river is interacted with and 
understood. 
The dominant contemporary conceptualization of the entire river as existing mainly for 
the benefit of the downstream irrigation economies is, as established in the chapter one, 
to large extent a product of the British Nile policies. These are the policies that have 
been codified and formalized in the Nile Water Agreements, which Egypt still considers 
the foundation of water regulation in the basin. 
The following chapter is divided into two sections: the colonial era and the post-colonial 
era. In both, the focus is chiefly on the treaties and infrastructure which are relevant to 
the contemporary conflict surrounding the construction of GERD, and through these on 
the ideas which have shaped the basin through British, Egyptian and Sudanese 
interactions with it. The chapter is based primarily on two books by Terje Tvedt (Tvedt 
2006, Tvedt 2012), as well as chapters by Fadwa Taha and Yacob Arsano in Tvedt 
(2010). These are considered sufficient, since an analysis of earlier Nile history is not 
the focus of the current study. 
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The Colonial Era 
British Egypt and Sudan 
From the end of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century, Great Britain was the 
dominant power in the Nile Basin. Egypt was colonized in 1882, and Sudan in 1899. 
Although London maintained de facto control of both Sudan and Egypt, the former 
remained nominally ruled by the Khedive (and prior to the First World War part of the 
Ottoman Empire), and the latter, as we shall see, by Egypt. 
While the initial goal of British conquest of Egypt was control of the Suez Canal as a 
route to India, the Nile quickly became a priority due to its unrivalled importance for 
Egypt. The aim of British Nile control was thus twofold: to cement British control over 
Egypt in order to secure access to the Suez Canal; and to improve cotton-production – at 
the time vital to the Egyptian economy – in order to improve the Egyptian ability to pay 
its debts to Great Britain and other European countries, which had run high due to 
considerable loans by pre-colonial Egyptian rulers (Tvedt 2006).  
In order to increase the productivity of Egyptian cotton production – which before the 
construction of the High Aswan Dam could be grown only in summer in conjunction 
with the flooding of the Blue Nile – the seasonal fluctuations of the river needed to be 
evened out. This initially lead to plans for dams on the White Nile, because the Blue 
Nile was considered unsuitable for the construction of dams due to the amount of silt it 
carries. 
The mud moved by the Blue Nile in one year was estimated to equal 160-180 million 
tons (UNESCO 2008), and this would cause any dam to become silted up in a short 
period. A dam on the White Nile, however, would be capable of storing water which 
could be sent down to Egypt during the dry season. Moreover, such a dam would be 
capable of expanding British control over Egypt through control of the Nile – Egypt’s 
only source of fresh water (Tvedt 2006). 
In a quote that encapsulates the British conceptualization of the Nile and remains 
relevant in light of Egyptian Nile policy today, Cromer, the British Consul-General in 
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Egypt wrote that “the effective control of the waters of the Nile from the Equatorial 
Lakes to the sea is essential to the Existence of Egypt” (Tvedt 2006:29). 
It was in this context the British Empire in 1899 took control of Sudan, having already 
set foot on Lake Victoria in their effort to control the White Nile from its sources in 
South-East Africa. The conquest of Sudan was largely paid for from Egyptian coffers 
and was made by Egyptian forces in the name of Egypt, where the idea of unity in the 
Nile Valley was popular (Tvedt 2006). Although the Condominium Agreement between 
Britain and Egypt nominally gave Britain and Egypt joint responsibility for the territory 
of Sudan, it became a de facto possession of Britain. 
Shortly after this expansion of British Nile control, Sir William Edmund Garstin, the 
influential Under-Secretary of Public Works in Egypt, took Anglo-Egyptian Nile 
control to its logical conclusion when he in 1904 authored a plan for the British 
Government which for the first time conceptualized the Nile as “one river that existed 
for the benefit of the irrigation economies in the north […] (Tvedt 2006:73). In a project 
emblematic of the contemporary belief in Western rational superiority, the British 
aimed to completely control the Nile from its sources in Ethiopia and around the Great 
Lakes to its mouth in the Mediterranean – all for the benefit of London, Egypt and to a 
lesser extent Northern Sudan. 
The British plans for developing Sudan conceptualized the Southern part of the country 
more or less exclusively as a way to transport water to Egypt and the North. In North 
Sudan, the most significant development project was the Gezira Scheme, which was to 
become the largest cotton farm in the world. In order to provide adequate water for it 
and increase both the water supply to, and control over Egypt, Great Britain planned to 
construct the Sennar Dam on the Blue Nile in Sudan – a project that was controversial 
in Egypt for reasons similar to the ones surrounding GERD. 
Construction began in 1914, but due to the outbreak of the First World War, the dam 
was not completed until 1925. Despite the fact that almost 80 percent of the dam’s 
water was reserved for Egypt, the project caused outrage there. It was at the time seen 
as a threat to the Egyptian Nile and a way for London to pressure Egypt – where the 
Wafd Party under the leadership Saad Zaghloul was campaigning for independence 
(Tvedt 2006). 
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At the hands of London, and through the continued development of infrastructure, 
Sudan became at once a carrot and a stick to be used for control over Egypt. This 
increased control became especially urgent in the context of an increasingly restive 
political climate, which culminated in the Egyptian revolution of 1919 and the unilateral 
British declaration of Egyptian independence in 1922. 
This independence nevertheless left London in control over the Suez Canal and with 
considerable influence in Egypt. The following quote from the Foreign Office in 1923 
shows that British aims towards control over Egypt had not diminished: “the power 
which holds the Soudan [sic] has Egypt at its mercy, and through Egypt can dominate 
the Suez Canal” (Tvedt 2006:87). 
The case of the Sennar Dam shows that there is historical precedence for the Egyptian 
worry about upstream Nile control. Dams both in Sudan and in Ethiopia – as we shall 
see below – were considered instrumental in British Nile control, and the capacity to 
withhold water from Egypt was an explicit part of London’s strategy. 
The Nile Water Agreement of 1929 
In 1929, an Exchange of Notes between the British High Commissioner in Egypt and 
the Egyptian Government laid the foundations for the first Nile Water Agreement, 
which aimed to provide a legal basis for water allocation and construction of 
infrastructure in the entire basin. This agreement, writes Tvedt: 
(…) can partly be seen as an expression of Britain’s weakened position as 
compared to the years before the Egyptian revolution, and partly as a 
reflection of the convergence of Egyptian perceptions of the Nile as basically 
an Egyptian river and British strategic thinking. (Tvedt 2006:148)  
The agreement did however not directly specify water amounts. Based on the 1920 Nile 
Project Commission report, it was estimated that Egypt had the right to 48bn cubic 
metres, while Sudan was allowed to take a limited amount – estimated at 4bn cubic 
metres – for the Gezira Scheme. No other state was party to the agreement. Still of 
importance today, it specified that “no works that might prejudice [Egypt’s] interests 
could be executed on the river or any of its tributaries upstream” (Tvedt 2006:145). 
27 
 
Clearly biased towards Egypt, this agreement has caused a long-term divide between it 
and Sudan – as we shall see below. 
Ethiopia and the Plans for a Dam on Lake Tana 
Unable to seize control of Ethiopia, the British allied with its emperor Menelik II, 
whom they did not see as a threat. London partly supported the emperor for two 
reasons. Firstly, he served as a bulwark against Italian power in the Nile basin – Italy 
considering Ethiopia to be inside its own sphere of influence. Secondly, London was 
trying to obtain his permission to build a dam on Lake Tana6. 
Great Britain’s assertion of its influence also on the Ethiopian Blue Nile was enshrined 
in the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, which assured that neither Ethiopia nor Italy 
could construct a dam on the Blue Nile without the express agreement of London and 
Sudan (Tvedt 2006). 
In the same way as the Sennar Dam, the prospective dam on Lake Tana was after the 
British declaration of Egyptian independence in 1922 regarded by Great Britain 
potentially both as a carrot and a stick towards Egypt. As is clear from the following 
British secret memo: 
His Majesty’s Government are indeed in the position of being able to 
threaten Egypt with the reduction of her water supply, and this is sufficient 
in itself to create a feeling of anxiety and resentment in Egyptians: on the 
other hand His Majesty’s Government cannot offer to increase the water 
supply of Egypt unless the construction of the Tsana reservoir is undertaken. 
Once this work is completed they will be able, without in any way 
abandoning their power to damage Egypt by reducing the supply, to 
tranquilize Egyptian anxiety by offering to increase that supply to a very 
great extent. (Tvedt 2006:117-118). 
According to the British plan for the Tana dam, Egypt and Sudan would each receive 
fifty percent of the water, although Egypt would shoulder the brunt of the construction 
cost. In addition to leveraging power over Egypt, the British administration in Sudan 
wanted to use the dam as a way to provide more water for the Gezira Scheme. 
                                                 
6 Lake Tana collects the rainwater of the Ethiopian highlands before sending them down the Blue Nile. 
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The construction of the dam proved difficult, however, and with the advent of the 
Second World War it had not come to fruition. In 1935, Mussolini took power in Italy 
and instituted a much more aggressive policy in East Africa. He occupied Ethiopia, and 
a couple of years later he sent his engineers to Lake Tana to plan for his own dam there, 
which he planned on using to put pressure on Britain and Egypt. His plans came to 
nothing, however, and in 1941 a British force defeated the Italians and reinstated 
Ethiopian Emperor Halie Selassie. 
At the beginning of World War Two in 1941, it was suggested that Sudan should pay 
for, build and operate the dam with Egyptian observers present. Egypt wanted a dam at 
Lake Tana under its own control, but did not want Sudan to be a formal partner in a 
future agreement on the lake because Cairo regarded Sudan as part of Egypt. At the end 
of the Second World War, at the cusp of a dramatic decrease in British power both 
regionally and globally, no clear and agreed upon plan for a Tana dam existed. 
Despite the failure to construct the dam, there are important lines to be drawn between 
the events surrounding the Tana dam and the current situation surrounding GERD. 
Egyptian fears of a dam in Ethiopia has a historical precedent, and as with the Sennar 
dam, so do Egyptian fears of upstream powers threatening to use water control to wield 
power over Egypt. 
The Post-Colonial Era 
Egypt and the High Aswan Dam 
In July 1952, King Farouk – the figurehead monarch of British power in Egypt – was 
overthrown, and power passed to the military – where it has remained since but for 
President Morsi’s brief and ultimately unsuccessful reign. Great Britain remained in 
control of the Suez Canal for a few more years, and Sudan remained formally under 
Anglo-Egyptian control, as it had been since the 1899 Condominium Agreement. 
In 1956 President Gamal Abd el-Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, partly in response 
to the withdrawal of financial support for his grand development project the High 
Aswan Dam by a coalition consisting of Britain, The US and the World Bank. The 
Egyptian search for new funders set the stage for a geo-political struggle between the 
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United States and the Soviet Union, the latter eventually prevailing and funding the 
dam’s construction (Tvedt 2006). 
The High Aswan Dam was a project of immense value both symbolically and 
practically, asserting and expanding Egyptian control over the Nile waters, it would be 
able to store the water sent down the river two tears in a row. Thus it may be argued that 
Egypt’s independence was born from Nile Control, just as Nile Control previously had 
been used to keep Egypt dependent. Tvedt writes: 
The Aswan project came to be regarded as the cornerstone in the policy of 
the new regime, which saw it as no less than Egypt’s salvation. It should 
provide life-giving waters throughout the year and cheap electricity in 
abundance for industrial development and rural electrification, and protect 
the country from devastating floods. It would, Nasser declared, make Egypt 
the Japan of Africa. But most important – it would ‘nationalise’ the Nile. 
The Sadd el Ali, or the Nasser dam as it was also called, was a grand and 
potent symbol of national sovereignty and revolutionary zeal (Tvedt 
2006:261). 
A quote it may be useful to keep in mind when considering the significance of GERD 
for Ethiopia. 
Sudan and the Nile Water Agreement of 1959 
In 1951, the Egyptian government unilaterally declared Egyptian rule over Sudan, 
however after the 1952 coup in Egypt, the new government dropped these claims, and 
instead demanded Sudan’s independence from Britain: 
During the final years of the [Egyptian] monarchy, the Wafd had demanded 
the unity of Egypt and Sudan under the Egyptian crown. Although Britain 
tried to separate Egyptian issues from the question of the Sudan, Egypt 
insisted on linking the two. By the time the RCC7 came to power, Britain 
had recognized that in order to clear the way for discussions on the status of 
the Suez Canal, it would have to settle the dispute over the Sudan. The RCC, 
for its part, did not give the retention of the Sudan a high priority and went 
so far as to drop Egyptian claims for sovereignty over the country and to 
demand instead the granting of Sudanese self-determination. Britain, eager 
to settle its outstanding differences with Egypt, accepted the RCC’s terms. 
                                                 
7 The Revolutionary Command Council, led by the Free Officers Movement of which Nasser was a member. 
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The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, signed in February 1953, recognized the 
Sudan’s right to self-determination and set forth the steps that would achieve 
that goal. Two years later, the Sudanese parliament proclaimed 
independence (…) (Cleveland and Bunton 2009:287). 
Meanwhile, the burning question was the division of water between the two states. In 
Sudan, opposition to the Nile Water Agreement of 1929 was growing, and the Sudanese 
National Assembly demanded a larger portion of the Nile waters. At the same time, the 
plans for the High Aswan Dam were controversial, as it was set to flood Sudanese 
lands. 
The Egyptian Government’s way of dealing with Sudanese dissatisfaction with the 
allocated water amounts was not helpful. The initial response of Major Salah Salem, a 
spokesperson of the Egyptian Government, was to minimize Sudanese water scarcity: 
Salem spoke on relations between Egypt and Sudan and how these were tied 
to the Nile issue: Britain’s Nile policy was the main obstacle to unity of the 
Nile valley; the imperialists had convinced the Sudanese that their inability 
to obtain sufficient water was because of Egypt’s control over the Nile under 
the 1929 Agreement, a ‘fallacy’ exposed by the Army Movement. After the 
completion of the High Dam scheme Egypt ‘could supply the Sudan free of 
charge with 11 times as much Nile water as she was now obtaining’ (Tvedt 
2006:282). 
In other words, the Egyptian government adopted a line whereby they criticized the 
British rhetoric of water scarcity by in Sudan, and claimed this was all part and parcel of 
an imperial plot to destroy the relationship between Egypt and Sudan, and to hinder 
Sudanese development. This was not only incorrect but harmful, because it gave the 
impression that no opposition or conflict existed between Egypt and Sudan when the 
opposite was true: 
The British in Khartoum noted yet again, as they had done since 1900, that 
the Nile issue was a question of a vital conflict of interest between the two 
countries. At this crucial juncture in regional politics, the British should not 
let ‘Salem or any other Egyptian get away with propagating the specious 
idea that this conflict does not exist’ (…) (Tvedt 2006:282). 
The characterization of the basin as free of conflict over water allocations is an 
important part of contemporary ideology in the Blue Nile Basin, and is something we 
will return to in later chapters.   
31 
 
It was in the context of negotiations on the High Aswan Dam and Sudanese 
dissatisfaction with its water allocations that Egypt and Sudan went to the negotiation 
table in 1954 to amend the Nile Water Agreement of 1929. While accepting the 
established rights of the countries, the Sudanese delegates demanded that further 
allocation of water be based on the Cory Award of 1920, according to which any 
unappropriated water should be divided between the two countries according to their 
potential irrigable land. The result of this would be a total of 23bn cubic metres to 
Sudan based on the allocations when the Cory Award was first formulated, although the 
water required to develop all suitable land in the 1950s was estimated at 35bn cubic 
metres. Egypt first offered Sudan 5.9bn cubic metres, and finally 8bn cubic metres. The 
gap between this and the Sudanese demands caused the negotiations to break down 
(Tvedt 2006). 
At the end of 1958, there was a coup in Sudan, and the new leader requested 
negotiations reopened. Around the same time, Sudan withdrew water from the Sennar 
Dam earlier in the year than allowed according to the Nile Water Agreement of 1929, 
and was consequently accused of breaking agreement. In response the Sudanese 
government claimed they were not party to the agreement – a treaty between Great 
Britain and Egypt – and therefore could not break it. The return to the negotiating table 
was nevertheless welcome by Egypt, who needed an agreement in order to construct the 
High Aswan Dam, which as mentioned would flood Sudanese territory. 
November of the same year the Nile Water Agreement of 1959 was signed. It was a 
compromise between the Egyptian and Sudanese positions, however Egyptian 
compensation to Sudan for flooding Sudanese territory was set at half of the original 
demand, and the costs of inflation and resettlement were not taken into account (Taha 
2010:190). Sudan made its acceptance of the High Aswan Dam contingent on Egyptian 
acceptance of the Sudanese construction of the Roseires Dam, which would increase 
Sudan’s ability to utilize its share of the Nile water. A dam initially opposed by Egypt 
on the basis of the Nile Water Agreement of 1929. The final compromise between the 
two countries permitted the construction of the High Aswan Dam providing the 
following conditions were met: 
The Sudan’s ultimate share in the natural flow of the Nile as measured at 
Aswan must be determined before work was started: the Sudan would then 
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have the right to build on the Nile or any of its tributaries such dams or other 
control works necessary for effective utilization of her share in the natural 
flow of the Nile; and the population of the town and district of Wadi Halfa 
must be provided with an adequate alternative livelihood in some part of the 
Sudan before the water level at Halfa was raised above its present maximum. 
Egypt must bear the entire cost of providing this alternative livelihood and 
of transferring the population (…) (Taha 2010:188). 
Furthermore, this highly controversial agreement finally quantified Nile water 
allocations between the two countries. As mentioned in chapter one, the average annual 
flow of the Nile was estimated at 84bn cubic metres, from which 10bn cubic metres 
were subtracted due to evaporation. The allocations were then based on the estimations 
made in the agreement of 1929, which granted Egypt 48bn cubic metres and Sudan 4bn 
cubic metres. 
According to the Nile Water Agreement of 1959, Egypt took 7.5 of the unallocated 
22bn cubic metres, and Sudan took 14.5. Making the final allocation 55.5bn cubic 
metres to Egypt and 18.5bn cubic metres to Sudan. Again, no other Nile country was 
allocated any water or was even party to the agreement. Because Sudan did not have the 
capacity to use its entire allocation, an agreement was made for Egypt to borrow 1.5bn 
cubic metres a year from Sudan (Taha 2010). 
As it stands, Sudan has never been able to utilize the full amount allocated to it. Much 
of the problem lies in the fact Sudanese water management institutions since 
independence have lacked funding and capacity. Moreover, the compensation for 
flooded Nubian lands and resettlements proved woefully inadequate at half of the 
original demand, leaving Sudan to pay most of the bill (Taha 2010).  
According to Taha, relations have in general been good between Egypt and Sudan on 
the issue of water (2010). After independence, Egypt has been considered an important 
Sudanese ally and there have been sporadic but continual attempts at increased 
integration between the two countries8. 
Nevertheless, there have also been conflicts, the most significant ones here concern the 
negotiations surrounding the Nile Water Agreement of 1959 over water allocations, 
                                                 
8 For more information see Taha Hussein 213. 
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discussed above; the Hala’ib triangle, discussed below; and mounting tensions after the 
1989 coup in Sudan which saw the Islamist President Omar Bashir take power. The 
relationship deteriorated further after Sudan was blamed for an attempt at President 
Hosni Mubarak’s life in Addis Ababa in 1995. 
Hala’ib Triangle 
Due to the difference between the political border established by the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium of 1899 and the administrative boundary set by the British in 1902, 
control over the so-called Hala’ib Triangle on the Sudanese-Egyptian border is 
disputed. The area measures about 20,000 square kilometres, and there continues to be 
considerable political tension over who controls it. Since independence, both Egypt and 
Sudan have laid claim to it, although it has de facto been controlled by Egypt since 1992 
(Guo 2006). 
Ethiopia 
Not party to any of the Nile Water Agreements, the Ethiopian position has been 
concerned with the need to exploit its water resources in order to develop. In this 
context it has played a key part in promoting the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) as an – 
from the Ethiopian perspective – equitable and comprehensive legal and political 
framework for the basin. Ethiopia has stuck to the principle of ‘absolute territorial 
sovereignty’9, defending its rights to exploit the water resources falling within its border 
(Arsano 2010). GERD may be read as a concrete expression of this principle. 
The Nile Basin Initiative 
The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was founded in 1999 with the dual aim of improving 
cooperation between the Nile Basin countries and working towards the establishment of 
a legal and institutional framework for the regulation and management of the Nile river 
                                                 
9 The opposite is “absolute territorial integrity”, asserting that any development in an upstream state that would 
interfere with the natural flow of a shared water course should be prohibited (UNWC 2015). 
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(Arsano 2010). There has been some success in the former endeavour, however the 
latter has been plagued by problems. 
In May 2010, Ethiopia was among five original signatories to the Cooperative 
Framework Agreement (CFA) – also known as the Entebbe Agreement – which is 
intended to substitute the Nile Water Agreements as the legal basis of the basin. The 
remaining members of the basin signed the CFA in quick succession – with the 
exception of Egypt and Sudan. Taha writes: 
Notwithstanding the ups and downs in other areas of Egyptian-Sudanese 
relations, the two nations have joined forces in all matters concerning status 
quo with regard to the Nile waters. This is also evident in the ongoing Nile 
Basin Initiative process. Throughout this process Egypt and Sudan strongly 
uphold the “existing agreements”. The seven upstream nations [eight after 
the secession of South Sudan], however, insist that a new agreement be 
reached to supersede the already existing agreements, which do not take into 
consideration the rights and interests of all riparian nations (Taha 2010:216). 
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3 The Legitimization and 
Subversion of Dominance in the 
Blue Nile Basin 
Egypt – ‘A First Among Equals’ 
A good point of entry into how the Egyptian ideological complex in the Blue Nile Basin 
represents Egyptian dominance is an article by former Interim Prime Minister Hazem 
Bablawi in al-Ahram entitled “The Nile is Common Property, Not a Private 
Commodity”10 (Bablawi 2013). In it he presents the claim that because the Nile is not 
produced by anyone it cannot be owned by anyone – comparing it in this respect to air. 
Bablawi apparently forgets the history of engineering projects in the basin, claiming that 
it is not for anyone to make choices regarding where a river begins and how it flows. It 
allegedly does not need humanity to strive for obtaining it, the rain falls where it falls 
without human interference, thus the river begins where it begins and flows where it 
flows. 
He goes on to declare the Nile a “Global Public Good” and states that “no state has the 
right, by itself, to change the conditions of these rivers or lakes without coordination 
with the other states which that share these”11 (Bablawi 2013). Affirming the right of 
every state to develop so long as they coordinate to avoid negative effects for any other 
state: “and when the issue relates to adjustments of the Nile course for the sake of 
increasing the capacity to use [the river], whether for irrigated agriculture or electricity 
generation, all of this is legitimate and desirable” (Bablawi 2013) 12, 13. 
                                                 
10 ".ةصاخ ةعلس سيلو ةكرتشم ةيكلم لينلا" 
11 ".اهيف ةكراشملا لودلا عم قفاوتو قيسنت نود تاريحبلا وأ راهنلأا هذه عاضوأ نم ريغت نأ ـ اهدرفمب ـ ةلود قح نم سيلو" 
12  ةيورملا ةعارزلا نم ديزمل ءاوس لبقتسملا يف همادختسا ةءافك ةدايز لجأ نم لينلا يرجم يلع تلايدعت ءارجإب رملأا قلعتي امدنعو"
بولطمو عورشم رمأ اذه لكف ,ةقاطلا ديلوتل وأ".  
13 Here he likely refers to the fact that Ethiopia has changed the course of the Blue Nile in order to be able to 
construct GERD – while at the same time appearing to contradict his earlier statement that it is not for anyone to 
choose where the river flows. 
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The issue, he claims, is how to achieve benefits for all. In other words, the correct 
approach should concern not the good of one state, or a few states, but the common 
good. Ethiopia – like all Nile states – has the right to develop, but in a way which helps 
everyone else develop and harms nobody, because all are in the same boat. This view on 
common development is echoed in a range of articles, both from al-Ahram and from the 
other Egyptian newspapers14. 
Crucial to this view, the discourse is eager to emphasize the Egyptian focus on 
negotiation and cooperation as the only viable solution to the crisis15 16. In the words of 
then-Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy: “the solution to the crisis with Ethiopia [will not 
come] except by dialogue”17 and “there is no zero-sum [solution] in the case of a vital 
issue like water, in other words [there can be] no solution which realizes the interest of 
one party without also realizing the interests of the other party”18 (al-Istiwaiyya and 
Aman 2014). 
While asserting these principles of solidarity between the basin countries, however, 
Bablawi at the same time asserts the power and privileged position of Egypt: leaning on 
a conviction of historical rights – another idea evident in a vast array of articles across 
all three newspapers19 – Bablawi claims that “the Egyptians are the oldest to interact 
with the Nile [standing for the first “organized exploitation” of the river] and the family 
                                                 
14 See for example: Farhat and Fuʾad 2013, al-Ahram 2013c, Samy and Fathy 2013, al-Ahram 2013a, Antar 2013, 
Abdelhameed 2014, Jaballah and Zahran 2014, Shury 2014a. 
15 See for example: al-Ahram 2013a, Samy and Fathy 2013, Zahran 2013, Sarur 2013, Karam 2013, Agag 2013, 
Aman 2013e, Abdelhameed 2014, al-Masry al-Youm 2014, al-Istiwaiyya and Aman 2014. 
16 The consensus around this was made clear from the backlash following the infamous televised meeting in the 
summer of 2013 between then-President Morsi and senior political figures where they discussed military actions 
against GERD. There are one or two mentions of military action as a potential course of action (Agag 2013), but 
these do not appear to be widely agreed with and the meeting is in general sharply criticized as a serious misstep and 
misrepresentation of Egypt (Ramadan 2013a, el-Din 2013, Ezzat 2013). 
17 ".راوحلاب لاإ نوكي نل ايبويثإ عم ةمزلأا لح" 
18 ".رخلآا فرطلا نود فرط ةحلصم ققحي لح دجوي لا يأ ,ةايملا ةيضق لثم ةيويح ةيضق يف ةيرفص ةلداعم دجوت لا" 
19 See for example: Farhat 2013, Samy and Fathy 2013, Sarhan 2013, Ramadan 2013a, al-Masry al-Youm 2013, 
Antar 2013, Aman 2013f, Fahmy 2013, Aman 2013e, Aman 2013a, al-Qawsy 2014, al-Ahram 2014, Reslan 2014a, 
Jaballah and Zahran 2014, Shury 2014b, Salem, et al. 2014b, Aman 2014a, Mahmoud 2014. 
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of Egypt all came from Africa”20. The latter point again asserting solidarity between 
Egypt and the upstream states. 
Moreover, he claims that Egypt’s role in the Nile basin is a product of geographical and 
hydrological factors: the “calmer and more stable” flow of the river downstream 
allegedly favouring agricultural development – causing agriculture to be invented in 
Egypt rather than the upstream states, and accordingly the emergence of Egypt as the 
oldest civilized state in Africa (Bablawi 2013). 
This statement is characteristic of Egyptian ideology in the Nile Basin: projecting strong 
bonds of cohesion between the Nile countries – social cohesion, hydrological cohesion 
and geographical cohesion – while at the same time, allegedly due both to the ecological 
and geographical characteristics of the river and to its superior capacity for leadership 
(discussed below), asserting that Egypt is the natural leader of the basin. This 
ideological complex and be summarized as ‘a first among equals’. 
Relatedly, the basin is in the Egyptian media discourse consistently divided into the 
apparently distinct and opposing units ‘dawlatain al-masab’ and ‘duwwal al-manbaʻ’. 
‘Masab’ refers to the outlet or drain of the river, whereas ‘manbaʻ’ refers to its spring or 
origin21. In this context they may be translated as “upstream states” and “downstream 
states”. In the Blue Nile Basin, Egypt and Sudan are in both Egyptian and Sudanese 
newspapers considered downstream states, whereas Ethiopia is considered upstream. 
Here, a brief but – it is hoped – useful digression is the perspective of one of the most 
prominent Egyptian geographers, Sulayman Huzzayin. Shortly before Egyptian 
independence from Great Britain Huzzayin sought to divide the Nile Basin into two 
distinct geographical areas. He theorized that the Nile Valley – encompassing Egypt and 
the Northern and central parts of Sudan – was distinct from the Nile Heights – 
encompassing the remaining countries (Tvedt 2012). As we have seen in chapter one, 
this distinction makes geographical and hydrological sense, and is how the basin has 
been conceptualized throughout the modern era. 
                                                 
20 ".ايقيرفإ نم اعيمج اوءاج دق رصم لهأو لينلا عم لماعت نم مدقأ مه نويرصملاف" 
21 See for example: Farhat 2013, Samy and Fathy 2013, Bablawi 2013, al-Ahram 2013b, Nasser 2013, al-Sharq al-
Awsat 2013, Aman 2013b, Aman 2013f, Aman 2013c, Shury 2014a, Aman 2014b. 
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Tvedt writes: 
From a geographical point of view, only the parts of the Nile Valley which 
comprise Egypt and the central areas of Sudan represent what [Huzzayin] 
referred to as a (…) a distinct Nile Environment. Only [these areas] consist 
of similar geographical and ecological characteristics, forming an integrated 
geographical unit where the Nile (…) is the decisive and all-encompassing 
geographical factor. (…) In this part of the Nile Basin, [Huzzayin] claimed, 
the people formed a common organic unit which over time tended to develop 
similar ideologies, religions and institutions. Culture mirrored and served, 
so to speak, the ecological and social structures in society (…) and thus 
ensured [society’s] integrity and stability. In this perspective, Egypt is not 
only the civilizing force, but an actor which merely does what nature 
demands from it (Tvedt 2012:176-177). 
Bablawi appears to draw on a similar perspective in his conviction that Egypt is the 
natural and almost God-given leader of the basin: 
And as the Creator chose [where] the rain falls and the start of the headwaters 
without any human interference or choice, He also determined the path of 
these rivers to their estuaries. For the rivers are a blessing from the Creator 
to humanity [both in where they begin, and in where they flow]22 (Bablawi 
2013). 
Bablawi presents no proof of his claims, but historical accuracy is in any case not the 
point of this political and ideological statement. It establishes a regional hierarchy, with 
Egypt in the role as the oldest civilization in the Nile Basin – its natural leader – while 
emphasizing the solidarity both of Egypt with the other Nile states; and of the other Nile 
states with Egypt. All ostensibly belong to the same family and all have equal rights to 
development.  
Laying the explicit foundations for the logonomic system of Egyptian ideology, former 
Vice Minister of Irrigation and Head of the International Commission on Large Dams, 
Abdurrahman Shalaby makes the question of law explicit. He claims, like Bablawi, that 
Egyptians have lived in Egypt for “a hundred thousand years”, and ties this to the right 
of easement. This, he claims, legally establishes the right of Egypt to its share of the 
                                                 
22  راهنلأا هذه راسم ددح اضيأ هنإف ,يرشب رايتخا وأ لخدت يأ نودو ,راهنلأا عبانم ةيادبو راطملأا طوقس عضوم قلاخلا راتخا امكو"
رشبلل قلاخلا نم ةمعن راهنلأاف .اهتابصمل يف اهطقاسم أ هنم ةمعن يه امك ,عبنملا دنعياض صملا يتح اهراسم يفب".  
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Nile waters, because it can document its historical use of these waters (Abdelhameed 
2014). 
He also takes the necessary stance – obviously shared by the Egyptian government – 
that international law recognizes agreements authored by occupying (colonial) powers 
(Abdelhameed 2014). In other words, the right granted Egypt in 1929 to veto 
construction on the Nile is still valid, as are the water allocations from 1959 – built on 
the Nile Water Agreement of 1929. For that matter, so is the right granted Sudan in 
1902 to veto Nile construction – a right Egyptian ideology considers it is incumbent 
upon Sudan to use, as we shall see below. 
In short, Egyptian ideology asserts that all Nile states are fundamentally equal in their 
pursuit of development, and that because they share the Nile River all should take care 
that their interactions with it do not cause others harm. A stance that appears almost 
self-evident. 
The catch is that Egypt by virtue of alleged historical, geographical and hydrological 
facts, and a certain view of international law takes it upon herself to be the executor of 
this purportedly natural order – and in doing so lays claim to the vast majority of the 
Nile waters and asserts a veto right on all Nile construction. To paraphrase George 
Orwell – all Nile Basin countries are equal, but some are more equal than others. 
The contradiction implicit in Egyptian Nile ideology should be clear: Egyptian 
dominance in a basin ostensibly characterized by equality – or in the words of Hodge & 
Kress, solidarity. What Bablawi describes above appears almost a ‘survival of the 
fittest’: Egypt was the first to claim rights on the Nile due to incontrovertible 
hydrological and geographical factors, therefore it has supreme Nile rights. 
A related contradiction lies in Egypt’s vehement opposition to unilateral action on the 
Nile – when Egypt and Great Britain have a long history of unilateral action on the Nile, 
and the former still claims the products of such action (The Nile Water Agreements) are 
the legitimate basis of Nile regulation. Obscuring the fact that the treaties which today 
seek to prevent unilateral action in the Blue Nile Basin themselves were created by 
unilateral action is thus – as we shall see – key to the functioning of Egyptian ideology. 
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The following chapter provides an in-depth discussion of this ideological complex, and 
the logonomic system which supports and enables it. Firstly, it is argued that a key 
function of Egyptian ideology in the Blue Nile basin is to legitimize Egyptian 
dominance. Fundamental to this function, the logonomic system is outlined, and the 
ways in which it is institutionalized are discussed. Secondly, the Egyptian ideology’s 
representations respectively of Ethiopia and Sudan are discussed and compared, 
demonstrating how Egyptian ideology works to legitimize Egyptian dominance over 
these states. At the same time, Sudan and Ethiopia serve as examples of the 
consequences for breaking the logonomic rules. Finally, the findings of this section are 
summarized, and it is argued that solidarity is a key principle of the ideology of 
Egyptian dominance. 
The Logonomic System and the Institutionalized Legitimization 
of Dominance 
In constructing and/or propagating a specific reading of the history, geography and 
hydrology of the Nile Basin, Bablawi works to sustain the contemporary basin order 
through the claim that it is a consequence of natural factors, and is based in scientific 
knowledge. More specifically, he works to legitimize the contemporary order through an 
image of what the basin is and what it should be. 
In other words, he claims that concrete rules pertain to the Nile Basin, rules purportedly 
given by nature and/or God (in this context, the difference is unclear) and expressed 
through scientific knowledge. These rules are enshrined in the Nile Water Agreements, 
privileging Egypt as the main beneficiary of the Nile, and the guarantor of stability and 
shared interests. In the theoretical-methodological framework of Hodge & Kress, these 
rules constitute the foundations for the logonomic system of the Egyptian ideology. 
The reason the Egyptian ideological complex, summarized as “a first among equals”, 
can function despite its inherent contradictions is this logonomic system. As discussed 
in chapter one, this system regulates who can produce and receive which messages 
under which circumstances. 
The logonomic rules statements regarding legitimate interaction in the Blue Nile Basin 
must follow are outlined by Bablawi above. On the most fundamental level, these are: 
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1) the Nile Water Agreements are the basis of basin law; 2) this law guarantees Egypt’s 
historical right to its share of the Nile waters; 3) it also guarantees the Egyptian right to 
veto construction on the Nile River in order to protect its water allocation; 4) all other 
Nile countries have equal rights to benefit from the river provided 1)-3) are not 
interfered with; and 5) the goal of basin interaction is mutual development through the 
pursuit of shared interests, understood as the pursuit of the equal rights established in 4).  
Within Egypt, this logonomic system is explicitly taught and policed by a range of 
institutions tied to knowledge production and the spread of information. In this case 
most significantly through the news-media and official state discourse; and the 
institutions which regulate media and discourse. These also enforce rules regarding who 
can make official or legitimate statements concerning the Blue Nile Basin. 
Media discourse in Egypt is regulated by the state, both through the state media, 
through the security forces which occasionally confiscate publications or stop printing, 
and through the judicial institutions, which occasionally sanction legal action (Mada 
Masr 2014, Afify 2014, Mada Masr 2015)23. Moreover, the Egyptian logonomic system 
leads to a degree of self-censorship by those who fear sanctions, and/or by those who 
internalize specific norms regarding news coverage (Hughes 2014)24. 
The result of this is – as pointed out in chapter one – that it is very difficult to publish 
messages not in harmony with the state view. The relatively homogeneous character of 
Egyptian media coverage indicates that the logonomic system within Egypt is quite 
effective. The articles covered by this study corroborate the picture given in chapter 
one, with both al-Ahram and the private newspapers sticking close to the state line when 
it comes to GERD and the Nile. 
Unsurprisingly, all al-Ahram articles studied in this thesis tell of a clear editorial policy 
towards the issues of GERD and the Blue Nile basin, strongly opposing any 
construction on the river or alteration of its course or flow without express Egyptian 
agreement. The coverage appears coordinated and unanimous – dissenting voices hardly 
                                                 
23 For more information see: http://www.madamasr.com/tags/media-crackdown.  
24 For more information see: http://www.madamasr.com/tags/censorship.  
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appear and Sudanese and Ethiopian points of view are given very limited and highly 
editorialized coverage. 
The articles from al-Masry al-Youm analyzed in this study suggest that their coverage 
of GERD and the Blue Nile basin is at least somewhat more pluralistic than in al-
Ahram. While the state view is not explicitly challenged by the newspaper or its 
journalists and columnists, it allows Sudan and Ethiopia more of a voice, and 
editorializes tem to a somewhat lesser degree than al-Ahram. The articles from al-
Shorouq suggest it takes a similar position to that of al-Masry al-Youm when it comes 
to GERD and the Blue Nile Basin. The state position is not directly criticized by the 
newspaper or its writers, yet it publishes less editorialized Sudanese and Ethiopian 
voices than al-Ahram. 
According to Zeitoun et.al., these rules and the ideology they support are not necessarily 
explicitly imposed. Hegemony is – among other things – characterized by the more or 
less willing adoption by the dominated or non-hegemons of the ideology, knowledge, 
discourse and/or rules of the dominant or hegemon – potentially without awareness that 
such adoption is taking place (Zeitoun, et al. 2014). 
Egypt has long been the hegemon of the Blue Nile Basin – which is to say that its 
ideology – its world-view – has held a privileged position. According to Zeitoun et.al., 
this means that decision-makers in non-hegemonic countries may internalize ideas held 
by the hegemon. The dominated, Zeitoun et.al. suggest, may sometimes adopt the 
ideology of the dominant without any form of overt imposition. 
To the extent that Egyptian ideology is hegemonic in the basin, in other words, Zeitoun 
et.al. contend that these rules have a strong standing also outside Egypt. Here they are 
perhaps most clearly taught and enforced through the Nile Water Agreements, and 
asserted through the Egyptian position in fora for negotiation and cooperation. 
As it stands, however, this logonomic system and the ideological complex it supports 
appear to be losing at least some efficacy outside of Egypt. The Egyptian logonomic 
rules are to a limited extent being subverted in the Sudanese discourse – as we shall see 
below. This is combined with an express aim for increased Sudanese influence in the 
basin, explicitly disputing Egyptian ideology and contesting its logonomic system. 
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As exemplified later in the discussion of Sudan and Ethiopia, an important part of the 
Egyptian logonomic system is the construction of scientific knowledge that supports 
Egyptian dominance. More specifically, this entails an Egyptian claim to a superior 
understanding of the history, hydrology and geography of the Blue Nile Basin, and a 
refusal, as we shall see, to recognize scientific knowledge authored by Sudan and 
Ethiopia allegedly due to their inferior research methods and capabilities. In other 
words, the claimed Egyptian control of scientific knowledge seeks to establish Egyptian 
ownership and control both over the construction of this knowledge, and over the 
assessment of what is ‘good’ or ‘correct’ knowledge. 
The claimed Egyptian control over the production of scientific knowledge is 
exemplified by the following statement by then-Egyptian Minister of Irrigation 
Muhammad Allam: 
[Egyptian fears are supported] by American and Egyptian studies on the 
highest scientific level and with the use of the most modern mathematical 
models (…). The information we have from the Nile Basin States does not 
at all measure up to the Egyptian technical level in the field of Information 
Technology, and not to the level of Egyptian technical and diplomatic 
[expertise] present in these states25 (Metwaly 2014). 
In a similar vein, an article published in al-Ahram entitled “The final report of the 
tripartite committee on the Renaissance Dam: the Ethiopian designs for the dam are 
inadequate (…)”26 criticizes the provided Ethiopian technical information concerning 
the construction of GERD for not being up-to-date and for being founded on inadequate 
methodologies and simplified models of simulation. It also criticizes the methods for 
designing parts of the dam (Farhat 2013). 
The Egyptian control claimed over knowledge-construction and the assessment of the 
value of knowledge is used to propose increased Egyptian control over the construction 
of GERD. If the Egyptian expertise is heeded, it is argued, the dam should be smaller, 
                                                 
25  جذامنلا ثدحأ مادختسابو يملع ىوتسم ىلعأ ىلع ةيكيرمأو ةيرصم تاسارد اهمعدت يتلاو ،دسلا نم انفواخم نلآا ىتح حرطن مل اننإ"
ةيضايرلا  )...(لا لينلا ضوح لود نع انيدل ةرفوتملا تامولعملا نأو ف يرصملا ينقتلا ىوتسم ىلإ ًاقلاطإ ىقرت ايجولونكت لاجم ي
لودلا هذه يف ينفلاو يسامولبدلا يرصملا دجاوتلا ىوتسم ىلإ لاو تلااصتلااو تامولعملا".  
26  ضوح ةيقافتا يف هتكراشم ديمجت نع عجارتي نادوسلاو ..ةرصاق دسلل ةيبويثلأا تاميمصتلا:ةضهنلا دسل يئاهنلا ةيثلاثلا ةنجللا ريرقت "
لينلا".  
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or else it should be substituted by several smaller dams, a suggestion made in both al-
Ahram and al-Masry al-Youm (Samy and Fathy 2013, Karam 2013). This would 
reportedly have equal benefits without the risks. 
On this absolute conviction of scientific fact, Egyptian discourse – as we shall see – 
builds a critique of Sudan and Ethiopia for either misunderstanding the issue and/or 
playing political games around it – i.e. making it a game either about alliances and 
domestic politics, or about power grabbing, rather than what it should be: simply a 
question about engineering, hydrology and indisputable legal rights. 
Aside from the system tied to the production and spread of knowledge, discussed above, 
the most important institutional expression of the logonomic rules tied to Egyptian 
ideology is the Nile Water Agreements and to a lesser extent the Anglo-Ethiopian 
Agreement of 1902. As discussed in chapter two these give Egypt a veto right on all 
construction in the Nile Basin, and allocate the entire Nile flow to Egypt and Sudan. 
The fact that the logonomic rules which support the Egyptian order are enshrined in 
what are claimed to be legal documents, it is argued, may cause the premises of 
Egyptian dominance to become more opaque. The circumstances of the authorship and 
related bias of the Nile Water Agreements towards Egypt may be obscured because law 
intrinsically is tied to justice, and because an important principle of law is that it apply 
equally to all. 
In other words, the solidarity or equality projected by Egyptian ideology in the Blue 
Nile basin is potentially strengthened because the logonomic rules which support this 
ideology are claimed to have legal status. Thus, it is suggested that despite having been 
constructed unilaterally by Egypt, Great Britain and Sudan primarily to serve Egypt, the 
alleged legal status of Nile Water Agreements is used to represent solidarity through 
equality. 
Because the rules governing the basin are framed in a manner which makes them appear 
self-evident, the discourse covered by this study frequently do not mention non-
cooperation with the respective agreements explicitly, but rather suggests it is simply 
accepted practice to seek Egypt’s agreement. For example, Bablawi in the introduction 
to this chapter simply asserts that it is common practice to consult all members of the 
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basin before constructing any infrastructure – without making any reference to the legal 
basis for this. 
Bablawi embodies the role of the basin leader, imbued with authority, and outlines the 
logonomic rules of the Egyptian Nile order, hinting at the consequences if these were to 
be broken. The consequences of breaking the rules of the Egyptian basin ideology do 
not in this instance entail any sanctions from Egypt or supra-national bodies, but simply 
the implication of a basin characterized by self-interest and opportunism rather than the 
justice and equality which Bablawi and Egypt ostensibly guarantee – as we shall see in 
the following section. The logonomic rules are self-evident – and ideally self-enforcing 
– in the sense that any other rules would likely lead to the ruination of the basin27. 
The result of the self-evident manner in which the rules of the basin are presented, their 
claimed legal authority and the Egyptian scientific supremacy that lie at the base of the 
Egyptian logonomic system is that Egyptian dominance is represented as non-political, 
in the sense that nobody could legitimately contest it. 
Ethiopian Transgression 
As we have seen, Egyptian ideology posits that all states in the basin have equal rights 
to pursue development so long as they do not challenge what through its logonomic 
system is defined as legitimate and in service of what is good for all without being 
detrimental to any. Thus the ideology projects solidarity with all who are seeking what 
Egypt defines as legitimate basin activities; and Egyptian power as the arbiter of what is 
and is not desirable in the basin, and the defender of order and the common good. 
An illustration of the bonds of solidarity is that Ethiopia commonly is referred to as a 
brother ‘akh’28, part of the apparent family of the Blue Nile Basin (further discussed 
below) – casting Egypt and Ethiopia in a close relationship which Ethiopia apparently is 
choosing to ignore. 
                                                 
27 Incidentally, the idea of self-evident or even self-enforcing rules is fundamental to the understanding of ideology in 
hydro-hegemony (see chapters one and four). 
28 Farhat 2013, al-Ahram 2013c, al-Istiwaiyya and Aman 2014, Jaballah and Zahran 2014. 
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Accordingly, the Egyptian ideology represents Ethiopia first and foremost as selfishly 
and opportunistically crossing the line of what constitutes legitimate use of the Blue 
Nile, and as a direct consequence of this, as putting both Egypt and the rest of the basin 
at risk. Briefly put, the prevailing argument is that Ethiopia has ambitions of becoming 
a regional power, and is likely to use the increased Nile control resulting from GERD to 
project power in the Blue Nile Basin – asserting Ethiopian control over the basin, and 
through it, over Egypt. 
Consequently, GERD is referred to as a question of National Security (Jaballah and 
Zahran 2014, Aman 2014b) and a question of life-and-death (al-Qawsy 2014, Salem, et 
al. 2014a). In an extreme example, the prominent opposition politician Hamdeen Sabahi 
is even quoted stating that the dam “is tantamount to a declaration of war on Egypt”29 
(Sarhan 2013). 
There appears to be consensus across all three papers that GERD will considerably 
change the balance of power in the region (elHendi 2013, Fahmy 2013, Reslan 2014a, 
Reslan 2014b) – potentially throwing the entire basin into disarray due to its 
unilateralism and blatant disregard for cooperation and consultation30, values at the very 
heart of Egyptian ideology. Ethiopia is chastised for its lack of solidarity, and is 
reported to “claim that the [Nile] water is its private property”31 and to work towards 
being the sole controlling party of the Nile waters, ostensibly with the aim of selling 
water outside the basin (Reslan 2014a). 
The Egyptian opposition to GERD is founded in a near-universal denunciation of the 
project as harmful and dangerous to Sudan, Egypt and the basin at large32. Aside from 
contravening the Nile Water Agreements, it reportedly suffers from “catastrophic” 
design flaws (Salem 2013a), which leave the dam open to risk from earthquakes (al-
Qawsy 2014, Reslan 2014b) – threatening to flood vast areas, including parts of Egypt: 
                                                 
29 ".رصم دض برح ةلاح نلاعإ ةباثمب" 
30 Bablawi 2013, Agag 2013, Salem 2013a, al-Masry al-Youm 2013, Farhat and Fuʾad 2013, Aman 2013b. 
31 ".اهل صاخ كلم هايملا نأ ايبويثإ هيف معزت يذلا تقولا يف كلذو" 
32 See for example: al-Ahram 2013c, Farhat 2013, al-Ahram 2013b, Nasser 2013, el-Din 2013, Ezzat 2013, Antar 
2013, al-Qawsy 2014, Reslan 2014b, al-Ahram 2014, Abdelhameed 2014, Kamel 2014, Aman 2014b. 
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(…) the possibility for the dam’s destruction is great, due to Ethiopia’s 
lacking concern for necessary research at the location of the dam’s 
construction, in order to ensure the suitability of the ground, and the absence 
of faults or earthquakes (…)33 (al-Qawsy 2014). 
What Egypt is fighting for according to this view, is not only its own interests but also 
the interests of all basin countries and the basin as a whole. If there is a threat, whether 
by speech or action, against this common good – here represented by GERD – Egypt 
takes it upon herself to bring about change to maintain stability and shared interests. 
Given the representations of GERD and Ethiopia in Egyptian discourse, such a 
guarantor appears needed in a basin clearly under threat. Indicative of its ruthlessness, 
Ethiopia is represented as exploiting Sudan by pressuring it and interfering in domestic 
policy in order to ensure its support for GERD. It is accused of taking advantage of 
internal strife in Sudan and of supporting the Sudanese opposition (al-Shaykh 2014, 
Shury 2014b), and is reported at the same time both to pressure Sudan, and to seek 
closer cooperation with Sudan by forging an alliance – potentially to the detriment of 
Egypt (EFE 2013, Sarur 2013, Aman 2013a). 
Ethiopia is furthermore portrayed as stubbornly seeking to push through GERD by any 
means necessary in order to increase its regional power. Aside from allegedly breaking 
regional and international law, this – as we have seen – includes impeding or refusing to 
carry out research on GERD, its construction and consequences despite Egyptian 
requests (Farhat 2013, Aman 2013b, Salem 2014, Salem, et al. 2014b), and stalling the 
negotiations (Shury 2014b) with the aim of forcing Egypt into accepting the dam 
(Abdelwahab 2013). 
As for Ethiopian diplomacy and negotiation, the image brought across is one of 
Ethiopia conducting the bare minimum of effort to respond to and keep up a semblance 
of participation and exchange with Egypt, while at the same time seeking to impede any 
cooperation with Egypt and hinder any progress in the negotiations (Aman 2013a, 
Aman 2013c). 
                                                 
33  مدعو ةبرتلا ةيحلاص نم دكأتلل دسلا ءاشنإ عقوم يف ةيرورضلا ثوحبلا لمعب ايبويثإ مامتها مدع ةجيتن ةريبك دسلا رايهنا تاناكمإ"
لزلاز وأ ةيضرأ تازه ثودح مدعو قلاوف دوجو".  
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The image is one of Ethiopia engaging in cooperation and diplomacy in an underhanded 
and dishonest fashion, using the legitimacy that these mechanisms are associated with in 
order to push through its agenda. In other words, diplomacy and negotiation is 
apparently used as part of the Ethiopian arsenal in its attempt to coerce Egypt and others 
into accepting GERD. 
The sum of the above is a representation of Ethiopia as threatening to plunge the basin 
into uncertainty and conflict due to its own selfishness, opportunism, power hunger and 
shoddy understanding of the basin and scientific knowledge. This obviously legitimates 
Egyptian control over the basin in order to ensure stability and equal rights. 
Finally, the above indicates what the consequences may be for breaking the logonomic 
rules of the dominant Egyptian ideology in the Blue Nile basin. GERD and related 
Ethiopian policy is represented as selfish, dangerous, opportunistic and blatantly 
disregarding the rights of others – even as an act of war or a threat to national security. 
GERD is represented as an Ethiopian device to gain more power, and importantly as a 
distinct absence of solidarity – a purely coercive mechanism. 
The Ideological Impossibility of Sudanese Agency 
Like Ethiopia, Sudan is represented in the Egyptian discourse as transgressing what 
constitutes legitimate rights to development, and as selfishly putting the basin at risk. 
While the Ethiopian construction of GERD is strongly condemned as a deliberate and 
planned threat to the basin, however, the Sudanese support for this construction is 
framed in slightly different terms. 
More specifically, it appears as though the Sudanese contestation of the current Nile 
order hits closer to home than the Ethiopian contestation. While Ethiopia, as we have 
seen, is represented as power hungry, opportunistic and destructive, Sudan is 
represented as “abandoning” Egypt (Aman 2013d), and its actions are described as 
baffling, a mystery (al-Shaykh 2014) and a riddle (al-Qawsy 2014). It is even suggested 
that the Sudanese support for GERD constitutes a downright betrayal of Egypt (Nasser 
2013, Farhat 2013). 
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The following quote from an article published in al-Ahram indicates the reason for the 
different discourse surrounding Ethiopia and Sudan: 
The complete and unconditional Sudanese support for the construction of 
what is called the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam caused surprise, astonishment 
and even condemnation from many in Egypt, because the government of 
Khartoum [pays no attention] to the established principles of the strategic 
relationship between the two brother countries34 (al-Shaykh 2014). 
Sudan is portrayed as letting down Egypt, which “at first thought that the two countries 
form[ed] a historical unit against the Ethiopian project”35 (Nasser 2013). Rather, it is 
affirmed, Sudan should always stand with its brother Egypt (al-Shaykh 2014) and they 
are referred to as one body (Aman 2013e) and as united or even a single unit (Farhat 
2013, Nasser 2013).  
This discourse of extreme solidarity is further illustrated by the consistent reference to 
Sudan as ‘brother’ in the Egyptian discourse. While the same, as we have seen, is 
widely true of Ethiopia, they are apparently brothers of different calibres. Ethiopia is 
referred to as brother “akh”, just as other African countries are “ikhwat”, in the sense 
that I might call my neighbour or friend brother, whereas Sudan is referred to as 
“shaqiq”, which translates to “full brother”, or brother from the same mother and 
father36. 
Corresponding to this is the distinction discussed in the introduction to this chapter 
between ‘dawlatain al-masab’ and ‘duwwal al-manbaʻ’, or “upstream states” and 
“downstream states”. All of the above suggests that Egyptian ideology draws on the 
shared history between the two, and on the Huzzaynian conceptualization of the basin in 
order to represent Egypt and Sudan as an integrated unit when it comes to Nile policy. 
From this ideological perspective – which represents Egypt and Sudan not just as allies, 
but as brothers engaged in the same struggle to ensure their mutual water rights – the 
                                                 
34  ناجهتساو لب بارغتساو ةشهد يبويثلإا ةضهنلا دسب يمس ام ءانب عورشمل طورشملا ريغو لماكلا ةينادوسلا ةموكحلا دييأت راثآ"
رصم يف طاسولأا نم ريثكلا, سلاا تاقلاعلا تباوث موطرخلا ةموكح زواجتل كلذونيقيقشلا نيدلبلا نيب ةيجيتارت".  
35 ".يبويثلاا عورشملل اداضم ايخيرات لاتكت لاكشي نيدلبلا نأ يلولأا ةلهولل تنظ يتلا ةرهاقلل ةبسنلاب" 
36 See for example: elDakhakhny 2013, Salem 2013b, Aman 2013d, Aman 2013e, al-Qawsy 2014, al-Shaykh 2014, 
Reslan 2014b, Shury 2014b, Salem, et al. 2014b. 
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Sudanese contestation of the basin order simply appears to make no sense. What this 
amounts to is that while the Ethiopian support for GERD is strongly denounced as a 
threat to the basin, Egyptian media discourse, while denouncing Sudan, almost appears 
to be looking to explain how this vital and long-time Egyptian ally could contest 
Egyptian dominance. 
Fundamental to this is the categorical and near-complete denial in the Egyptian 
discourse that GERD stands to benefit Sudan and Egypt in any way, discussed in the 
previous section. Based on which it is asserted that the Sudanese support for GERD 
cannot have been based on an accurate understanding of the situation37. 
Given such a complete dismissal of the benefits of GERD, combined with the 
ideological conviction of Sudan and Egypt as an integrated unit, the Sudanese support 
for the dam’s construction is sought explained by claiming that Sudan is politically 
unstable, and that the Sudanese government is caught up in internal crises (Reslan 
2014a). Accordingly, the choices of the Sudanese leadership are represented as 
constrained, and they are claimed to be distracted from the actual issue at question – 
namely the threat posed by GERD – by domestic political problems: 
It appears that the current Sudanese position has changed from merely 
agreeing to the dam, to (…) marketing and advertising the Ethiopian 
position. With this [change] it is clear that the Sudanese position has 
[changed] to favour short-term political considerations related to the 
[domestic] balance of power (…) and its internal challenges, with no regard 
for the strategic changes related to water and security issues in the Eastern 
Nile [basin]38 (Reslan 2014b). 
The nature of these short-term political considerations and internal challenges allegedly 
relate to a disgruntled opposition and an unpopular and incompetent government –
amounting to a situation which threatens the very unity and cohesion of the Sudanese 
state (Reslan 2014b). Khartoum reportedly faces serious economic problems, as well as 
                                                 
37 See for example: Farhat 2013, Nasser 2013, al-Qawsy 2014, al-Ahram 2014, Reslan 2014a, Shury 2014b, al-
Shaykh 2014, Reslan 2014b. 
38  حضتي كلذبو ،يبويثلإا فقوملل ةياعدلاو قيوستلا وه رخآ رود ىلإ دسلا ىلع ةقفاوملا درجم نم لوحت نادوسلل ىلاحلا فقوملا ودبي "
ةمئاقلا ةطلسلا تانزاوتب ةصاخلا ةيظحللا ةيسايسلا تارابتعلاا بيلغت ىلإ لعفلاب هجتا دق ىنادوسلا فقوملا نأ  نود ،ةيلخادلا اهتايدحتو
ىقرشلا لينلا ىف نملأاو هايملا عاضوأ ىف ةيجيتارتسلإا تاريغتلا ىف رظنلا".  
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an internal division that increases day by day (al-Shaykh 2014). Moreover, Ethiopia is 
allegedly key to understanding these challenges: 
The fact of the matter is that Khartoum’s puzzling position requires [the 
deciphering] of the domestic crisis which the ruling [government] is facing. 
[That is to say], the conditions of the war this government is leading against 
the Sudanese oppositional forces, and the [facts on the ground] of this war 
make it difficult for Khartoum to refuse Ethiopian demands39 (al-Shaykh 
2014). 
The reason this reportedly may be difficult is that Ethiopia allegedly supports the armed 
opposition in Sudan and administrates the negotiations between the Sudanese 
Government and the armed opposition, as well as negotiations between Sudan and 
South Sudan surrounding the status of oil-rich disputed area Abyei (al-Shaykh 2014). 
All of which reportedly gives Ethiopia considerable influence over Sudan. The head of 
the Sudan Unit at the Ahram Centre for Political Studies, Hany Reslan elaborates: 
Sudan has political reasons related to the stability of its rule [for supporting 
the construction of GERD], and for this reason is not able to anger the 
Ethiopian regime. The regime of Bashir has (…) lost legitimacy, suffers 
from economic and political problems and [is dependent on American aid]. 
Moreover, there are revolutionary bodies fighting the regime in Darfur, 
Kordofan and by the Blue Nile, as well as troubled relations between North 
and South Sudan, the negotiations between which take place in Ethiopia. [In 
addition] there is the question of Abyei, to which Ethiopia is party due to the 
presence of 4200 Ethiopian soldiers on Sudanese territory (…). [Finally] 
there is the negotiations between the regime of Bashir and armed 
revolutionary front “Ukumbu”, also taking place in Ethiopia. Due to [the 
above] Sudan has put all its [eggs] in the Ethiopian basket40 (Shury 2014b). 
In the context of this laundry list of reasons for Sudanese political instability, the current 
regime’s support for GERD is represented as a PR-campaign for the improvement of 
                                                 
39  يف مكاحلا ماظنلا اههجاوي يتلا ةيلخادلا ةمزلأا يف لمأتلا همسلاط كف ديري نمم جاتحي ريحملا موطرخلا فقوم نأ رملأا ةقيقح يفو "
ا يلع ريسعلا نم لعجي برحلا هذه ناديم عقاوو ةينادوسلا ةضراعملا تاوق دض اهدوقي يتلا برحلا فورظف ,نادوسلا ضفرت نأ موطرخل
ابلط ايبويثلإ".  
40  تاب »ريشبلا« ماظن نأ نع لاضف ،ىبويثلإا ماظنلا باضغإ عيطتسي لا كلذل ،مكحلا رارقتساب ةقلعتملا ةيسايسلا هبابسأ هيدل نادوسلا"
اقت ةيروث تاهج كانهو ،ةيكيرملأا ةنقحلا ىلع شيعيو ،ةيسايسو ةيداصتقا تلاكشم هيدلو ،ةيعرشلل ادقافو اموزأم ىف ماظنلا دض لت
اقلاعلا نأ امك ،قرزلأا لينلاو نافدركو روفرادويثإ ىف اهتاضوافم رادت ، نادوسلا بونجو لامش نيب ةبرطضملا ت ةلأسمو ،ايب«ةييبا» ،
 نم رثكأ دوجوب ،اهيف ىسيئر فرط ايبويثإ4200 لاب ةساسحو ةجرح ةمزأ ىهو ،ةينادوسلا ىضارلأا ىلع ىبويثإ ىدنج ماظنلل ةبسن
كسعلا ةيروثلا ةهبجلاو ريشبلا ماظن نيب تاضوافملا كانهو ،ىنادوسلا ةير«وبموكوا»بو ،ايبويثإ ىف اضيأ رادت ، ىنادوسلا ماظنلاف ىلاتلا
ك عضوىبويثلإا ماظنلا ةلس ىف ةقاروأ ل".  
52 
 
relations between Khartoum and Addis Ababa (al-Ahram 2014) and as a way to mollify 
the Sudanese public opinion, reportedly eager for Sudan to stand up to Egypt (Nasser 
2013). 
Given the reported disadvantages from GERD, and domestic political motivations for 
Sudan’s support, an editorial published in al-Ahram asserts that the Sudanese position 
simply cannot be taken seriously. The leadership should pull itself together and look at 
the facts of the matter: 
The time has come for Sudan to regard the issue of The Ethiopian Dam from 
a technical and scientific perspective in order to ascertain its damaging 
effects, [ignoring political points of view] that have no place in the current 
debate41 (al-Ahram 2014). 
In other words, it is alleged that the question of GERD is a question of technical and 
scientific facts, and the Sudanese leadership is admonished for its myopic domestic 
policy which allegedly stands to harm both Egypt and Sudan itself. Bashir is accused of 
either supporting the dam on a misinformed basis and/or of being deliberately blind to 
the problems of GERD in part due to the Ethiopian influence on Sudanese politics. In 
short, it is suggested that if Bashir had the actual benefit of both Sudan and Egypt in 
mind, he could not but oppose GERD (al-Qawsy 2014). 
In the most extreme instance, it is suggested that Egypt should “wisely intervene [in 
order to] end the civil war and prepare the way for the stability of Sudan and the 
election of a rightly guided (‘rashid’) government”42 (al-Shaykh 2014). In the absence 
of Egyptian intervention, it is warned that we may see a repetition of Somalia at the 
Southern border of Egypt. 
The result is a representation of Sudan as relatively powerless, and its government as 
incompetent and/or self-serving, eschewing the bonds of solidarity between Egypt and 
Sudan and ignoring the larger issues at stake. The conflict between Egypt and Sudan, 
then, is represented as merely political conflict rather than a conflict between actual or 
                                                 
41  فقاوم ىأ نع اديعب ،دسلل ةرمدملا راثلآا نم دكأتي ىتح ،ةينقتو ةيملع ةيؤرب ىبويثلإا دسلا ةيضقل نادوسلا رظنت نأ ناولأا نآ دقل "
لآا اهتشقانمل لاجم لا ةيسايسن".  
42 ".هل ةدشار ةموكح باختناو نادوسلا رارقتسلا ليبسلا دهميو ةيلهلأا برحلا يهني افيصح لاخدت رصم نم بلطتي" 
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real interests – as would be the case if GERD were beneficial to Sudan and harmful to 
Egypt. 
The above amounts to a representation of Sudan as not in its own right an agent on par 
with Egypt and Ethiopia when it comes to the Nile Basin. More precisely, the country 
can apparently only adopt one of two stances: either it maintains its historical unit with 
Egypt, or it betrays this and gives in to Ethiopian pressure. Egyptian ideology, in other 
words, appears to take an extreme ‘with us or against us’ approach. Complete with the 
assumption that one side is right and one is wrong. 
When ideology is the topic – as it is in this context – this representation of Sudan as 
lacking agency manifests in an ambiguity regarding whether or not it propagates its own 
ideology in the basin, or whether it propagates the Ethiopian or Egyptian ideology either 
because of Ethiopian pressure; or because it is seen almost as an extension of Egypt. 
There is no room for a middle position – which is what both the Sudanese media 
discourse discussed later, and Sudanese spokespeople in the Egyptian newspapers 
actually argue for43. 
Egyptian ideology, in other words, projects with Sudan bonds both of extreme solidarity 
and of extreme power. The Egyptian discourse represents the two as integrated to such 
an extent Egypt apparently takes it upon herself to act on the behalf of Sudan. The 
solidarity is apparently such that given the instability of the country, and the 
incompetence of the current government, Egyptian assistance is necessary to avoid 
catastrophe. 
All in all, the integrity, stability and agency of Sudan and its government do not fare 
well in the Egyptian discourse. The result is that Egyptian discourse denounces Sudan 
for supporting GERD and suggests that the Sudanese government is incompetent and 
failing; while at the same time giving the impression that Sudan or even Bashir and his 
government can hardly be held responsible for their actions because they are based on 
Ethiopian pressure and/or a poor understanding of the situation. 
                                                 
43 Ramadan 2013b, Reslan 2014b, Farhat 2014b, Farhat 2014a, Aman 2014c. 
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It appears as though the Egyptian discourse is excusing or not willing to take Sudanese 
behavior seriously, while at the same time denouncing it. As mentioned above, this may 
be indicative of an Egyptian inability or reluctance to accept a change in Sudanese 
policy and interests (or at least acknowledgement of these) in the Blue Nile Basin and a 
corresponding political move away from Egypt towards Ethiopia. From the vantage 
point of Egyptian ideology, it seems, such a move simply makes no sense given the 
representation Sudan and Egypt not just as allies but brothers engaged in the same 
struggle to ensure their mutual and shared water rights – established beyond any doubt 
by Egypt, with no possibility for any conflict of interest. 
Solidarity as Key to the Ideology of Egyptian Dominance 
A main finding of this study is that solidarity is key to the Egyptian ideology’s 
legitimization of dominance. According to this world-view, Egyptian policy in the Blue 
Nile basin is the manifestation of mutual interests and rests on solidarity with all basin 
countries, albeit in a way which privileges Egyptian interests. 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the basin is represented as characterized 
by strong bonds of cohesion – social, political, hydrological and geographical. This is 
demonstrated by the Egyptian ideological conception of itself as a first among equals, 
and by the claim that all Blue Nile basin countries should work together in pursuit of 
mutual development, while avoiding harm to any basin country. 
As we have seen, both Sudan and Ethiopia are consistently referred to as “brothers”, 
and – especially in the case of Sudan – denounced as one might family members. In the 
Egyptian discourse, in other words, the ideological world of the Blue Nile Basin almost 
appears to be as much a family as it is a river basin or a geo-political region. 
Breaking the rules related to solidarity, institutionalized in the Nile Water Agreements 
and the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, Ethiopia is castigated in the Egyptian discourse 
for its unilateral and self-centred perspective, and for adopting a negligent, ignorant or 
even deliberately destructive stance with no regards for other Nile countries or common 
interests. Similarly, the asserted solidarity between Egypt and Sudan is used to 
denounce the latter for actions siblings presumably do not commit against each other. 
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Sudan is as we have seen criticized both for “abandoning” and “betraying” Egypt, and 
its actions are described as “baffling”.  
This normative idea of solidarity as a more or less straight forward path to the common 
good lies at the foundations of the ideological legitimization of Egyptian dominance in 
the basin. Egypt readily dismisses all policy not based in this prescriptive 
conceptualization of solidarity as, in and best case scenario ignorant, and in the worst 
case scenario deliberately destructive. 
The argument seems to be that legitimate development which benefits all Nile states is 
largely a straight-forward thing to identify. There seems to be an ideological conviction 
in the Egyptian discourse that it has the clear answer of what is best for all parties, and 
that no conflict of interests exists. 
Given the alleged scientific fact and legal documents that lie at the heart of the 
contemporary Nile order, any contestation of this becomes an action that cannot be 
motivated by anything other than power hunger, recklessness and/or a poor 
understanding of the basin – exemplified by the representation of Ethiopia and Sudan 
discussed above. In the articles covered by this study, this is internalized to the point 
that the Egyptian opposition to GERD is framed not as a political agenda, but as a fait 
accompli pertaining to the natural order of the basin. 
Given the hydrological context discussed in chapter one, and the historical background 
discussed in chapters one and two, it seems no coincidence that it is solidarity which is 
represented by Egyptian media discourse as a necessity in the Blue Nile basin. To say 
that an every-state-for-itself mentality would be potentially catastrophic is a gross 
understatement. 
As discussed in chapter two, the prospect of upstream Nile control is not an abstract 
concept in the Egyptian imagination, but a relatively recent experience. The Egyptian 
discourse thus suggests that solidarity is more than simply a mechanism to assert 
Egyptian dominance in the basin, but rather fundamental to Egyptian ideology and 
apparently perceived as, or at least represented as, crucial to Egyptian existence. 
In other words, the foundation of Egyptian ideology in solidarity can and – it is argued – 
should be seen as a response to the history, geography and hydrology of the Nile. There 
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is every indication that Egypt is painfully aware of its geographic and hydrological 
position, and of its extreme vulnerability. Indicative of this vulnerability is the Egyptian 
conceptualization of the Nile as a question of National Security and a question of life-
and-death, discussed above. 
Sudan – ‘A Middle Party’ 
In subverting Egyptian dominance, Sudanese ideology is naturally oriented in relation 
to this dominance. In other words, because Egyptian dominance has shaped the 
ideological and political landscape of the Blue Nile basin, the Sudanese ideology 
necessarily exists with reference to this. 
As a consequence of this, the current section is organized along slightly different lines 
than the previous discussion of Egyptian ideology. It begins at the heart of the Sudanese 
ideology: namely its limited subversion of Egyptian ideology through a representation 
of it as hypocritical in its foundation in solidarity. Following this is a discussion of how 
GERD is represented as a legitimate Sudanese interest, and catalyst for cooperation in 
the basin. 
The final two sections look at the implications of these representations from a more 
theoretical perspective, discussing the Sudanese ideology’s limited subversion of the 
Egyptian logonomic system, and the implications of these limitations for the Sudanese 
subversion of the dominant ideology in the Blue Nile basin. 
The Hypocrisy of Egyptian Solidarity and a Limited Subversion 
of its Dominance 
Echoing Egyptian ideology, Sudanese ideology founds its critique of Egyptian 
dominance on a prescriptive idea of solidarity. Herein lies also the chief contradiction of 
the Sudanese ideology, and, it is argued, the reason its subversion of Egyptian 
dominance is a limited one. 
The Sudanese critique of lacking Egyptian solidarity is exemplified in the following 
quote, which appears almost passive aggressive in its formulation: 
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We ask not for recompense for all that Sudan has given and continues to 
give to Egypt. We question the fact that Egypt stands against all which 
serves Sudanese interests, and [we question] the absence of its support – 
even once – for Sudan in international or local issues. Why does Egypt 
distance itself from the involvement in any [difficulties] which concern 
Sudan, and [stick to] the position of an onlooker, when it wants [Sudan] to 
not be [an onlooker] in what concerns [Egypt]?44 (al-Baqer 2014). 
It is made is made even more explicit in the following quote: 
(…) the Egyptian policy towards Sudan is not at all built on attachment or 
compassion, nor on common interests, it is built on [Egyptian] ambitions in 
the area. The proof of this may be that [Egypt] solved its problem with Israel, 
Taba, and yet it does not solve its problem with Sudan, Hala’ib45 (al-Sayyed 
2013b). 
Not unlike how Ethiopia is represented in the Egyptian discourse, in other words, 
Egyptian ideology and policy in the basin is in the Sudanese discourse widely 
represented as built primarily on a desire for control of the river, with little or no regard 
for solidarity – a representation evident in a range of articles46. 
Egypt is criticized for adopting an exploitative policy in the Blue Nile Basin, and for 
considering Sudan a dependent whose support is taken for granted: 
 
  
                                                 
44  مدخي هنأش نم ام لك دض رصم فوقو نع لءاستن لب رصمل همدقيو نادوسلا همدق ام لك لايح لباقملا نع سيل لءاستن انرودب نحنو"
؟ةيميلقلإاو ةيلودلا هاياضق يف ينادوسلا بناجلا عم ةدحاو ةرمل ولو فوقولا مدعو ةينادوسلا حلاصملا نت اذاملو نع اهسفنب رصم ىأ
؟اهصخي اميف كلذك نوكي لاأ هديرت اهنأ نيح يف ،جرفتملا فقوم فقتو ،نادوسلا صخي رامغ يأ يف ضوخلا"  
45  لعلو ،ةقطنملا يف عماطملا ىلع ىنبت لب ،ةكرتشملا حلاصملا لاو ًاقلاطإ فطاوعلا ىلع ىنبت لا نادوسلا هاجت رصم ةسايس نأ امك"
اط ليئارسإ عم اهتلكشم تلح اهنأ كلذ ىلع ليلدلا نادوسلا عم اهتلكشم لحت ملو اببيلاح".  
46 See for example: Zaher 2013, al-Sayyed 2013b, Abdalqader 2013, Hayder 2013, al-Intibaha 2013c, Abeed 2013, 
al-Sayyed 2013a, al-Intibaha 2013a, al-Intibaha 2013d, al-Baqer 2014. 
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We find that Egypt deals with all issues [related to] Sudan according to a 
strategic vision limited in frame and features [which] is the result of [its] 
system of government. We [also] find that the focus of the Egyptian 
Government in its dealings with Sudan, that is to say its strategic vision, is 
that the political and governing system of Sudan be the subordinate to the 
Egyptian system. And that if this were to be rebuffed, Sudan would slip into 
a state of instability and attrition such as “the war of the South or Darfur”47 
(al-Sayyed 2013b). 
This apparently exploitative strategy is claimed to manifest most notably through the 
Nile Water Agreements’ lacking benefit for Sudan (al-Sayyed 2013a, al-Midan 2013c), 
the High Aswan Dam which lead to Sudan having to fund the relocation of those 
dispossessed by the filling of dam’s reservoir, and the agreement between Egypt and 
Sudan for Egyptian use of a part of the Sudanese allocation Sudan has been unable to 
exploit48: 
Egypt has since the Nile Water Agreement of 1959 taken from the allocation 
of Sudan [what Sudan could not utilize], [with Sudan] receiving nothing in 
return (…). In other words, Sudan [is in a position] to demand compensation 
for over 65 years of water49 (Abdalqader 2013). 
Sudan’s perspective on the High Aswan Dam is illustrated by the following quote, 
which again emphasizes the role of solidarity in basin interaction: 
Certainly the Egyptian people will not forget the positions of its brothers 
[ashiqqa’], for without their agreement [the High Aswan Dam would not 
have been built], and [their] generosity extended to shouldering the cost of 
resettling the families of [Wadi] Halfa, and the destruction of their crops, 
livestock and homes at Lake Nasser.50 (Hayder 2013, al-Intibaha 2013c). 
                                                 
47  ,اهيف مكحلا ماظن تاريثأتل جتان كلذبو ,حملاملاو رطلأا ةددحم ةيجيتارتسإ ةيؤر قفو نادوسلا اياضق لك عم لماعتت رصم نأ دجنو"
زئاكر نأ دجنو ماظنلا نوكي نأ يف ةيجيتارتسلإا اهتيؤر ينعي امب يأ ,نادوسلا عم لماعتلا يف ةيرصملا ةموكحلا  يف ةموكحلا يسايسلا
زنتسلااو رارقتسلا مدع نم ةلاح يف نادوسلا قلزني نأ بجي كلذ رزعت اذإو ,يرصملا ماظنلل اعبات افيدر نادوسلا بونجلا برحك" فا
".روفردو 
48 See chapter two. 
49  ،مويلا ىتح م1959 ةيقافتا دعب دوقع للاخ ىونعم وأ يدام لباقم نود ضئافلا نادوسلا بيصن نم ذخأي ناك املاطل يرصملا بناجلا"
 نم رثكلأ هايم ضيوعتب ةبلاطملا هيلع نادوسلا نأ ينعي امم«65 » ً اماع".  
50  افلح يلاهأ ريجهت ةفلك نادوسلا لمحتب ءاخسلا دتما لب ،يلاعلا ّدسلا ناك امل انتقفاوم لاولف ،هئاقشأ فقوم ىسني نل يرصملا بعشلا نإ"
رصان ةريحب يف مهناطوأو مهعورضو مهعورز ريمدتو".  
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Adding insult to injury, the tactics of continued attempts at Egyptian dominance are 
outlined: 
These days, Egyptian elites return with a single voice to the discussion of 
[GERD] and how Sudan – the defeated Egyptian ally – could agree to its 
construction, even though it is the main signatory and the second beneficiary 
of the Nile Water Agreement of 1959. Excusing [their] attacks on Sudan by 
[claiming] that it betrayed the agreement and was swept away by its own 
interests, destroying its shared interests with Egypt51 (al-Baqer 2014). 
And: 
What currently most disturbs the relationship between Sudan and Egypt are 
two issues: the first is Hala’ib and Shalateen which the Egyptian political 
elite has always put at the centre of the Egyptian-Sudanese relationship. And 
which they push and bring up whenever something is implied about it 
indirectly, or there is a leaked announcement or an action from Sudan’s side 
for the sake of its relationship with another country [than Egypt]. [This elite] 
considers that any decision in such a case [affects] the relationship between 
[Egypt and Sudan], as well as Egyptian interests directly. Just like what is 
happening now regarding the Ethiopian dam [the second issue]52 (al-Baqer 
2014).  
The claim that any action Sudan undertakes for the support of its relationship with a 
country other than Egypt is considered by the latter to directly impact the relationship 
between Sudan and Egypt certainly appears to have some substance based on the 
Egyptian ideology discussed above. As much is indicated by the strong denunciation, 
shock and outrage, and the reports of Sudan abandoning or even betraying Egypt 
expressed as a result of Sudanese support for GERD and aim for closer cooperation 
with Ethiopia. 
In short, an image is painted of Egypt as a calculating basin ruler, interested in a 
semblance of solidarity only to the extent that it furthers its own control over the river, 
                                                 
51  فيلحلا وهو هئاشنإ ىلع قفاوي نأ نادوسلل فيكو دسلا نع دحاو ناسلبو ىرخأ ةرم ثدحتلل مايلأا هذه ةيرصملا بخنلا دوعتو"
 ماعلا يف ةعقوملا لينلا هايم ةيقافتا نم يناثلا ديفتسملاو سيئرلا عقوملا وهو هرمأ ىلع بولغملا يرصملا1959  ىلع موجهلا نيرربم
رصم عم ةكرتشملا حلاصملا نع ًايضاقتم هحلاصم ءارو فرجناو ةيقافتلاا ناخ هنأب نادوسلا".  
52  بخنلا اهتعضو املاط يتلا بيلاح ةيضق ىلولأا ،ناتنثا ناتيضق ،نهارلا تقولا يف رصمو نادوسلا نيب تاقلاعلا وفص ركعي ام رثكأ"
 اهل َّنع املك ًادمع اهتراثإو اهرشح ىلع لمعتو ةيرصملا ةينادوسلا تاقلاعلا رصخ يف ًامهس ةيرصملا ةيسايسلاأ وأ حيرصت تلف وأ رم
د عم هتاقلاع حلاصل نادوسلا نم لمعلا سميو نيدلبلا تاقلاع باسح ىلع راطلإا اذه يف رارق يأ ربتعتو ىرخأ ةلو ةيرصملا حلاصم
يبويثلإا ةضهنلا دس عورشم نأشب نلآا ثدحي امك ةرشابم".  
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and over Sudan. A ruler that reportedly has interfered in Sudanese affairs ever since the 
latter was granted independence in 1956, and is increasingly distancing itself also from 
the other Nile Basin states: 
If Egypt has had any success in Africa, this has been its success in the 
provocation of its neighbours, especially Sudan. And whatever the case may 
be, there are many signs that reflect a Sudanese wish to break the shackles 
of dependency to Egypt. Perhaps this is evident from [its current] position 
on GERD53 (al-Sayyed 2013b). 
These representations of Egyptian dominance constitute a clearly worded critique, and 
are a clear subversion of the alleged solidarity of Egyptian ideology. Moreover, this is a 
critique that strikes at the heart of the Egyptian ideology’s refusal to acknowledge 
Sudanese agency, and a representation which rings true given the Egyptian discourse 
discussed above. 
At the same time, there are clear limitations to this subversion. Sudanese ideology 
consistently affirms the importance of development along what it insists are mutual 
interests and consistently claims that GERD is in the interest of all and harms no one – 
as discussed in the following section. A clear parallel to the Egyptian ideology’s 
emphasis on solidarity and mutual interests. 
Throughout the Sudanese discourse, there are repeated claims that Sudan will not do 
anything to harm Egypt54, for example, Sayyed asserts that there is an eternal 
relationship between Egypt and Sudan even while criticizing Egypt. A relationship 
apparently founded in strategic concerns in addition to the familial solidarity between 
the two countries discussed below: “we understand that the security of Egypt is the 
security of Sudan, and vice versa”55 (al-Sayyed 2013b). Another article carries the apt 
                                                 
53  نم ًاريثك كانه نإف ،رمأ نم نكي امهمو ،نادوسلا ةصاخ اهناريج زازفتسا يف اهحاجن وهف ايقيرفإ يف رصمل حاجن كانه ناك اذإ"
اهنلا دس ةيضق نم نلآا فقوملا نم ودبي كلذ لعلو ،رصمل ةيعبتلا دويق رسك يف نادوسلا ةبغر سكعت يتلا تارشؤمليبويثلإا ةض".  
54 See for example: al-Sayyed 2013b, al-Midan 2013c, Hayder 2013, al-Intibaha 2013c, Abdalqader 2013, Zaher 
2013, Akher Lahza 2014a, al-Baqer 2014, Akher Lahza 2014c, Akher Lahza 2014b. 
55 ".حيحص سكعلاو نادوسلا نمأ نم وه رصم نمأ نأ مهفن" 
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headline “The Minister of State at the Foreign Ministry: We will not Take a Position 
Which Harms Egypt”56 (Akher Lahza 2014a). 
However, even these assurances are usually part of a careful subversion or contestation 
of Egyptian dominance, as exemplified by the following quote from the Interior 
Minister of Sudan, speaking about GERD: “Ethiopia has a vision, Egypt has a different 
vision, and we in Sudan have a vision”57 (Akher Lahza 2014c). The Sudanese position 
is carefully staked out as not being the same as either Egypt or Ethiopia, although the 
title of the article is “The Minister of the Interior: We reject harm to Egypt from the 
Renaissance Dam”58. The same careful stance is evident in another quote from an article 
in the state newspaper Akher Lahza, which generally appears to adopt a more careful 
stance than al-Intibaha and al-Midan: 
Debate resulted from the Ethiopian decision to alter the flow of the Blue Nile 
in order to complete GERD, a step which was considered by Egypt and 
Sudan to threaten their water allocations. (…) But the question is: what are 
the actual long-term consequences of the dam for Sudan?59 (Gadid 2013). 
Along the same lines as above, this initially identifies Egypt and Sudan as a unit – in the 
same fashion typical of the Egyptian discourse – claiming that GERD may endanger 
both. Yet it concludes that the most important question concerns the long-term effects 
of GERD on Sudan. At the same time, Sudan and Egypt are represented as the unit 
‘dawlatain al-masab’’ in a wide array of articles also in the Sudanese discourse60.  
This conditional criticism of the Egyptian Nile order indicates the complexity of the 
Sudanese ideology, which is founded in a precarious balance between, on the one side a 
subversion of the ideology of Egyptian dominance, an assertion of increased Sudanese 
power in the basin, and a resulting political movement away from Egypt; and on the 
                                                 
56 ".رصم رضي ًافقوم ذختن نل :ةيجراخلاب ةلودلا ريزو" 
57 ".ةيؤر انيدل نادوسلا يف نحنو ،ىرخأ ةيؤر اهيدل رصمو ،ةيؤر اهيدل ايبويثأ" 
58 ".ةضهنلا دس نم رصم ررضت ضفرن :ةيلخادلا ريزو" 
59  نادوسلاو رصم اتلود اهتربتعا ةوطخ يف ،ةضهنلا دس لامكتسلإ قرزلأا لينلا رهن ىرجم ليوحت ايبويثا نلاعإ بقع ريُثأ فيثك لدج"
لينلا هايم نم اهتصح ىلع ًاديدهت )...( .لاا ةضهنلا دس مايقل ىدملا ديعب يقيقحلا ريثأتلا وه ام لاؤسلا نكلنادوسلا ىلع يبويث"؟  
60 al-Intibaha 2013e, al-Sayyed 2013a, AbdalRaheem 2013, Kalar 2013, al-Midan 2013b, Akher Lahza 2013b, el-Hag 
2014, Ahmed 2014, Akher Lahza 2014b, Akher Lahza 2014a. 
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other, on the maintenance of a close relationship with Egypt and – by virtue of the 
emphasis on GERD as beneficial to all – of the assertion of common interests as the 
goal of basin interaction. The Sudanese ideological complex may thus be summarized 
as a ‘middle position’, whereby Sudan is framed as a middle party, situated between 
Egypt and Ethiopia politically and ideologically, as well as geographically and 
hydrologically. 
Throughout, Sudanese ideology as we have seen draws on a somewhat different reading 
of modern Nile history than Egyptian ideology – one characterized not by Egyptian 
authority and benevolence, but by Egyptian selfishness and exploitation. The reading of 
the modern history of the Blue Nile Basin as a history of Egyptian dominance is an 
integral part of the Sudanese ideology’s subversion of this dominance. 
Sudan’s exceedingly close relationship with Egypt has obviously not – from this point 
of view – brought the benefits to warrant such a relationship, and as a sovereign 
country, the argument is that Sudan must be free to look elsewhere for allies, without 
having its motives questioned. The concrete expression of this new Sudanese influence 
is its support for GERD – discussed in the following section. 
Thus the bonds of power through which the Sudanese ideological complex is expressed 
depict not a basin characterized by Sudanese dominance, but one characterized by 
increased Sudanese influence over the Nile and its own interactions with it – with the 
historical context of a power deficit so severe that it apparently threatens the very 
sovereignty of the country. 
In an assertion of Sudanese agency, one article emphasizes the importance of Sudanese 
water independence and claims that “for the first time, Sudan has become more 
pragmatic in its interaction with regional alignment regarding water, and in its national 
position concerning the challenges of GERD”61 (Hayder 2013, al-Intibaha 2013c). A 
purported pragmatism further evident in the Sudanese ambition to expand cooperation 
with Ethiopia, discussed in the following section. 
                                                 
61 ".ةضهنلا دس تايعادت نم ينطولا هفقومو هايملا فلمل يميلقلإا قسنلاب لعافتلا يف كيتامجرب رثكأ نادوسلا حبصي ةرم لولأو" 
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The result of this in terms of Sudanese agency is that Sudanese support for GERD is 
represented as an ideology alternative to that of Egypt. This is indicated by fact that 
building it explicitly challenges the Nile Water Agreements, and the principle of 
absolute Egyptian supremacy in the basin. This entails an alternative discourse 
according to which the basin countries other than Egypt have increased rights and more 
of a say in the basin, the river not being understood only or primarily as an aqueduct to 
the North. 
GERD as a Legitimate Sudanese Interest and a Catalyst for 
Change and Cooperation in the Basin 
The Sudanese support for GERD is represented as a concrete expression of the new-
found Sudanese pragmatism discussed above, and an assertion of increased Sudanese 
influence and power in the Blue Nile Basin. Framed by much of the Sudanese discourse 
as an apparent watershed in the modern history of the basin, marking a beginning – or at 
least potential for – change to the Egyptian Nile order. 
In the interest of continued Sudanese development – which as we have seen is 
conditionally identified as legitimate by the Egyptian ideology – the argument is that 
given the substantial benefits of GERD, it simply makes no sense for Sudan not to 
support its construction. These benefits most notably include the generation of 
electricity (Yahya 2013, Abdalqader 2013), the protection of Sudanese dams from silt 
(Mirghany 2013, al-Midan 2013c) and flood protection (Kalar 2013). 
As we have seen in the previous section, Sudanese ideology rejects the Egyptian claim 
that Sudanese support for GERD is founded in domestic political considerations. One 
article responding to the Egyptian accusations is tellingly entitled “The Renaissance 
Dam: the Strategic Interests Are Stronger than the Political Interests”62 (Abdalqader 
2013). This claim is also explicitly made by President Bashir, who emphasizes the very 
real benefits from GERD, asserting that it makes very little sense for Sudan not at least 
consider both the dam and the potential for closer cooperation with Ethiopia (al-Intibaha 
2013b). 
                                                 
62 ".ةيسايسلا نم ىوقأ ةيجيتارتسلإا حلاصملا ..ةضهنلا دس" 
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At the same time, this support is generally represented not so much as a break with 
Egypt as it is an opportunity for a new shared vision or agenda for the basin – based in a 
general conviction that GERD is beneficial to all and harmful to none. The benefits of 
such a shared vision would reportedly be far-reaching, as illustrated by the following 
quote: 
Ethiopia is in (…) a hectic development boom, and Sudanese investments 
are flowing into Addis Ababa. The region is in need of Egyptian experience 
[combined with] Sudanese agricultural lands and Ethiopian water and 
skilled labour, [with which] the region may become more attractive, and 
there is nothing which stops it from being competitive with Japan and 
Malaysia63 (Yahya 2013). 
This demonstrates the same balance discussed in the previous section, between a careful 
subversion of the Egyptian order and the maintenance of the relationship with Egypt 
and of solidarity as a governing principle of ideology in the basin. In this respect it is, as 
we have seen above widely emphasized in the Sudanese discourse that Sudan will not 
agree to anything that may harm Egypt but rather is merely trying to promote its own 
national interest. 
While there are some warnings in the Sudanese newspapers regarding dangers related to 
construction and even Ethiopian plans for dominance in the basin (Mansour 2013, 
Abeed 2013, al-Midan 2014), these are few and far between, and often voiced by 
spokespeople of the Egyptian government. As discussed above, there is an emphasis on 
caution and ensuring no harm is caused. However, the argument made on the back of 
this concerns the importance of increased regional cooperation rather than halting 
construction of the dam or reducing its size. 
An integral part of Sudanese ideology, then, is the representation of GERD as a 
legitimate contravention of basin treaties, and the potential dangers and risks related to 
GERD which are foregrounded in the Egyptian discourse are generally downplayed, 
                                                 
63  تاربخ ىلإ ةجاحب ةقطنملاو ،ابابأ سيدأ ىلع قفدتت ةيبرعلا ةينادوسلا تارامثتسلااو ،ةيومنتلا ةرفطلا عم مومحم قابس ةلاح يف ايبويثأ"
معو ةقفدتم هايمو ةينادوس ةيعارز ضرأ دوجو عم ةيرصمانه سيلو رثكأ ةبذاج ةقطنملا نوكت دق ةيبويثأ ةرهام ةلا نوكت نأ اهعنمي ام ك
ايزيلامو نابايلل ةسفانم".  
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and its alleged benefit for all basin countries is emphasized64. The claim is made that 
GERD benefits not only Sudan, and that the risks tied to construction are relatively low, 
but also that there are potential benefits for Egypt – such as increasing the life-span of 
the High Aswan Dam (al-Intibaha 2013e, Yahya 2013, Akher Lahza 2014b). Here, 
Sudanese discourse naturally stands in stark opposition to that of Egypt. 
In a further contrast to the Egyptian discourse, Ethiopia is identified as a valuable 
partner for closer cooperation65. Based on the Sudanese discourse, increased 
cooperation between Sudan and Ethiopia clearly appears to also be an Ethiopian aim 
(al-Intibaha 2013c, al-Midan 2013c, al-Midan 2013a). Moreover, Ethiopia is 
represented as eager to promote cooperation also with Egypt (al-Midan 2013c, al-Midan 
2013a, Akher Lahza 2014b). This feeds into the image of Ethiopia and GERD not as a 
divisive issue in the basin, but as an opportunity for closer cooperation between all 
basin countries. 
The culmination is that GERD aside from being beneficial to Sudan is represented as a 
catalyst for change and increased cooperation in the basin. As we shall see in the 
following section, it appears to be considered a legitimate break with Egyptian 
dominance in the basin, and with the veto rights enshrined in the Nile Water Agreement 
of 1929. 
A Limited Subversion of the Egyptian Logonomic System 
The limited subversion of the Egyptian ideological complex is supported by limited a 
contestation of the logonomic rules that support the Egyptian ideology. More 
specifically, this entails a contestation of the validity of the Nile Water Agreements as 
the basis of basin regulation, and relatedly of the Egyptian veto right on construction 
across the river enshrined in them. 
                                                 
64 Abeed 2013, al-Sayyed 2013a, Mansour 2013, al-Midan 2013b, AbdalRaheem 2013, Hayder 2013, al-Intibaha 
2013c, Yahya 2013, al-Intibaha 2013e, al-Intibaha 2013b, Akher Lahza 2014b, el-Hag 2014, Ahmed 2014, al-
Intibaha 2014c, Akher Lahza 2014c, Akher Lahza 2014a. 
65 Yahya 2013, al-Intibaha 2013e, al-Intibaha 2013c, al-Sayyed 2013a, Abdalqader 2013, al-Intibaha 2014c, al-
Intibaha 2014b. 
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Based on the discussion in the previous sections, the most fundamental rules of the 
Sudanese logonomic system statements regarding legitimate interaction in the Blue Nile 
Basin must follow are: 1) the Nile Water Agreements are not a valid basis for basin law 
due to their colonial origins and over-privileging of Egypt; 2) all Nile countries have 
equal rights to benefit from the river provided no harm is caused to any other Nile 
country; and 3) the goal of basin interaction mutual development through the pursuit of 
shared interests, understood as the pursuit of the equal rights established in 2). 
The contestation of the Egyptian veto right on construction across the river enshrined in 
the Nile Water Agreement of 1929 is obviously implicit in the Sudanese support for the 
construction of GERD discussed above. The opposition to this is agreement is framed in 
terms of it being a an agreement between colonial powers, and not by the basin states 
themselves: “it is not possible for a state to [stay committed] to what was dictated by a 
colonizer”66 (Gadid 2013). An assertion that it must be possible to change regulations in 
the Nile Basin in light of new political developments. 
Moreover, the Nile Water Agreement of 1959 is widely contested, both because it is 
based on the Nile Water Agreement of 1929, and because it excludes all Nile states 
except Egypt and Sudan67. In sum, the implication of this post-colonial perspective on 
basin regulation is that such regulations should be jointly authored by all basin 
countries: “(…) Now we must build a shared strategic vision (…) and we must trust that 
all the agreements made in the previous century are not holy”68 (Hayder 2013, al-
Intibaha 2013c). 
At the same time, this contestation of the logonomic system is decidedly limited. As 
much is indicated by the fact that the latter two logonomic rules listed above are shared 
by the Egyptian logonomic system. Furthermore, the Sudanese logonomic system does 
not detail specifically how its definition of ‘equal rights to benefit from the Nile’ differs 
from the Egyptian definition. This is further discussed in the following section. 
                                                 
66 ".رامعتسلاا اهيلع هلامأ امب ةلود مزَُّلت نأ نكمي لا" 
67 Gadid 2013, al-Sayyed 2013a, Mirghany 2013, al-Midan 2013c, Hayder 2013, al-Intibaha 2013c, Yahya 2013, 
Abdalqader 2013, al-Baqer 2014. 
68 ".ةسدقم تسيل يضاملا نرقلاب ةمربملا لينلا هايم تايقافتا ةفاك نأ نيقثاو نكنلو )...( ةكرتشم ةيجيتارتسإ ةيؤر ينبت نم دبلا نلآاو" 
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As above, these logonomic rules are taught and policed by institutions tied to 
knowledge production and the spread of information – in this context most significantly 
through the news media and the institutions that regulate media and discourse. As 
mentioned in chapter one, both al-Intibaha and Akher Lahza have explicit bonds to the 
Sudanese government, and so may be seen as disseminators of state discourse. 
In the articles covered by this study, Akher Lahza appears to closely follow the same 
line that Sudanese government representatives are keen to express in Egyptian 
newspapers. Maintaining a careful balance between contesting Egyptian dominance, 
while anxious not to step on Egyptian toes. 
The articles analyzed from al-Intibaha are similarly supportive of GERD and critical of 
Egypt – although the tone of the criticism varies from strong denunciation to more 
careful questioning of the Egyptian status quo. It is however generally more outspoken 
in its criticism than Akher Lahza. 
The opposition paper al-Midan is similarly supportive of GERD and highly critical of 
Egyptian dominance, although it appears to strive towards a somewhat more balanced 
coverage, occasionally featuring articles supportive of Egypt and more critical of the 
Sudanese government. 
In sum, there appears to be a strong consensus across all three newspapers on the 
potential benefits of GERD, and on the contestation of Egyptian dominance in the basin. 
The fact that this point of view is evident also from an opposition paper known for its 
critical approach to the Sudanese government suggests that the position is not merely 
pushed through by the official institutions, but is supported also outside these. 
The Contradiction of a Middle Stance and the Failure to 
Acknowledge Conflicting Interests 
As established in the previous sections, the Sudanese ideology’s view of the basin is one 
of a brave new world in which all basin countries rely on cooperation to solve conflicts 
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and pursue shared interests69. In so depicting the basin, the ideology adopts a stance 
whereby Sudan is framed as middle party – politically as well as geographically and 
hydrologically. Asserting greater Sudanese power in the basin, while at the same time 
making an effort both to maintain a close relationship with Egypt, and to maintain the 
pursuit of shared interests as the goal of basin interaction. This stance has been 
discussed above, and is exemplified by the following quote: 
The solution [to the issue of Ethiopian control over GERD, and implicitly to 
the disagreement concerning the construction of GERD] may be [that it is 
necessary] for Sudan to intervene as an intermediary between the upstream 
states, Egypt and Ethiopia in order to reach a new treaty for the organization 
of water allocation70 (Gadid 2013). 
This Sudanese ideological middle stance is potentially problematic for two reasons. 
Firstly, if, as is suggested above, the goal of the Sudanese subversion of Egyptian 
ideology is to enable a greater political space for pragmatism and increased Sudanese 
influence over its use of Nile as well as its interactions with the other Nile states – then 
the characterization of this subversion as a middle stance is a contradiction. A middle 
stance – or neutrality, as it is called by the Sudanese Foreign Minister in the Egyptian 
newspaper al-Masry al-Youm (Farhat 2014b, Farhat 2014a) – would appear 
diametrically opposed to the freedom of choice that is the stated aim of a new Sudanese 
policy. 
In more concrete terms, if Sudan was to tie itself to a self-proclaimed middle position, 
then in the face of for example continued Sudanese support for Ethiopia – which is 
something Sudanese media discourse argues for – it would likely be an easy thing for 
Egypt to claim that Sudan does not in fact inhabit a middle position. In this case, 
Sudanese protestations that it is adopting a pragmatic policy in the basin would likely 
do little to ease Egyptian worries. 
                                                 
69 See for example: Akher Lahza 2013a, Yahya 2013, Gadid 2013, al-Intibaha 2013e, al-Sayyed 2013b, al-Intibaha 
2013c, al-Intibaha 2013b, al-Midan 2013c, al-Midan 2013b, Akher Lahza 2014b, Akher Lahza 2014c, al-Intibaha 
2014c, al-Intibaha 2014a, al-Baqer 2014, Ahmed 2014, Kalar 2014. 
70  ةديدج تايقافتإ ىلإ لوصولل ايبويثاو رصمو عبنملا لود نيب ام ًاطيسو نوكيل نادوسلا لخدت ةرورض يف نمكي ةيضقلا هذهل لحلاو"
هايملا صصح مظنت".  
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To put it bluntly, it may seem that the Sudanese middle position is a rhetorical device 
which although it appears to have been constructed in order to sugar the pill of 
Sudanese agency to Egypt ultimately is likely to do Sudan a disfavour because it is 
incapable of supporting the increased policy space the Sudanese discourse argues for. 
Secondly and relatedly, there is a strong message from both parties that any legitimate 
action or policy in the basin must be founded in solidarity and the realization of 
common interests – albeit that Egyptian and Sudanese ideas of what constitute common 
interests in this case appear at odds. 
As an apparent agreement between the two, the idea that the goal of basin interaction 
should be the pursuit of shared interests is both significant and potentially problematic. 
Firstly, it is of course significant to the extent that it indicates a compatibility between 
Egyptian and Sudanese points of view – a potentially promising prospect for future 
cooperation in the basin. 
The problematic feature of this apparent agreement is that neither party makes any 
suggestion regarding what the course of action should be – other than vague 
prescriptions of negotiation and cooperative measures – in cases of conflicting interests 
where substantive cooperation is not immediately possible. The current situation is an 
example of this, as the three countries in the Blue Nile Basin now apparently are unable 
even to agree on the conditions according to which studies of the dam should be 
completed (Hussein 2015b, Hussein 2015a) – let alone the identification of more or less 
elusive common interests. 
In more theoretical terms, while the Sudanese discourse subverts and contests Egyptian 
dominance in the basin, it appears to stop short of suggesting an alternative logonomic 
system to substitute the current one. The Sudanese claim to agency which is made on 
the back of a purported middle position appears – like Egyptian ideology – to be 
founded in a conceptualization of the basin where conflicting interests hardly exist. In 
both Egyptian and Sudanese ideologies, it seems the task for which basin regulation is 
needed is simply to facilitate cooperation and work towards more or less self-evident 
common interests that as a rule benefit all and harm no one. 
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How to identify these common interests or deal with situations where interests do 
conflict, without resorting to what amounts to a prescriptive and oversimplified 
judgement of their legitimacy and merit, is scarcely discussed. In the Sudanese 
discourse as in the Egyptian discourse, the impression is given that identifying shared 
interests is a relatively simple matter, and that any failure to pursue these must be 
motivated by selfishness or power hunger. This is especially harmful given that such an 
evaluation of legitimacy is an exercise in futility if – as the current case appears to be – 
all parties simply claim that their interests are legitimate shared interests, and their 
opponents’ are motivated by selfishness and power hunger. 
The Egyptian discourse glosses over its lacking acknowledgement of conflicting 
interests by differentiating between legitimate and non-legitimate interests, and brazenly 
founding the former in the Nile Water Agreements and the knowledge and historical 
narratives which support these. This is in the interest of Egypt, which as the hegemon of 
the basin has been able to successfully label its own interests as shared interests. 
Sudan, despite its criticism of these agreements and Egyptian exploitation, similarly 
distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate interests – merely proposing a 
different definition of what constitutes legitimate. The Sudanese discourse apparently 
seeks to base this definition in a post-colonial perspective, which although it appears 
relevant does not account for conflicting interests. This may do Sudan a disfavour if, as 
Zeitoun et.al. suggest, Sudan has fewer resources draw on for the propagation of its 
view than Egypt does as a result of Egyptian hegemony in the basin. 
If it is accepted that ideologies can be expressed as ideological complexes and 
logonomic systems; and that the latter regulate and support the former, then it follows 
that any subversion of an ideological complex which does not sufficiently subvert also 
the supporting logonomic system is likely to have limited efficacy, because the ideology 
at the heart of such a contestation will continue to be subject to the same rules as the 
ideology it seeks to criticize – rules which are an integral part of the original ideology 
and work to support and legitimize this.  
In sum, the Sudanese discourse appears to be suggesting that it is time to exchange the 
Nile Water Agreements – yet in doing so proposes that the prospective new order be 
based on the same vague principles of solidarity which have caused the old one to fail. 
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Namely a lacking acknowledgement of the fact that different Nile countries have 
different and conflicting interests. 
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4 Ideology in Hydro-Hegemonic 
Theory 
Chapter three has demonstrated the viability of the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress 
as a theoretical-methodological framework for the study of ideology and discourse in 
the Blue Nile Basin. In the current chapter, the findings presented above are placed in 
the theoretical context of hydro-hegemony. 
There are as, mentioned in chapter one, two concrete aims for connecting the social 
semiotics of Hodge & Kress and hydro-hegemony: firstly, addressing, the lacking 
hydro-hegemonic methodology for the study of discourse and ideology; and secondly, 
addressing the generalized nature of the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress, which 
provides no theoretical-methodological framework for the study of how ideology relates 
to the world of the Blue Nile Basin outside discourse. 
Put differently, the strength of hydro-hegemony lies in its comprehensive and inter-
disciplinary approach to power and state interaction in river basins, and in its 
conceptualization of ideology and discourse as fundamental to transboundary river 
interaction. Its weakness lies in its lacking methodological capacity for the systematic 
study of these latter concepts. The strength of the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress on 
the other hand lies in its ability to study ideology as a functional socio-political concept. 
Its weakness lies in the generalized nature of its theory, and in its limitation to the study 
of discourse. 
As mentioned in the introduction, it is suggested – although additional research is 
needed into the nature and role of ideology and discourse in transboundary river basins 
– that a key flaw resulting from the inadequate methodological approach to ideology in 
hydro-hegemony is an overly compartmentalized understanding of the role and nature 
of ideology and discourse, whereby their impact is considered to be limited to more or 
less effective so-called subtle mechanisms. 
Moreover, the concepts of ideology outlined respectively by Zeitoun et.al., and by 
Hodge & Kress appear theoretically and methodologically compatible. This is due to 
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their mutual focus on power-asymmetry and, as we shall see, respectively on coercion-
consent and power-solidarity as twin determinants of control. 
The current chapter consists of two sections: firstly, the theoretical framework of hydro-
hegemony is briefly presented and its compatibility with the social semiotics of Hodge 
& Kress discussed; following this, a critique of its conception of ideology is given with 
a foundation in the theoretical-methodological framework of the social semiotics of 
Hodge & Kress and the findings of this study. 
Hydro-Hegemonic Theory and the Social 
Semiotics of Hodge & Kress 
As mentioned in chapter one, the hydro-hegemonic approach to transboundary river 
basin interaction places power along a scale from overt to subtle, with ideology at the 
latter extreme of this scale. Towards the same extreme is located hegemony – opposed 
to what Zeitoun et.al. refer to as dominance, which is based in non-subtle forms of 
power: 
If brute force is being used by a powerful riparian, the arrangement is 
probably not by definition hegemonic (since the situation is in flux, and an 
order is being established). If more subtle forms of power – such as the 
framing of solutions, setting of agendas, or sanctioning of discourses – are 
being used, the transboundary water arrangement is likely hegemonic (in the 
sense that attempts are being made to generate the consent of the non-
hegemonic actors (Zeitoun, et al. 2014:1-2). 
The meaning of subtle in this context relates to consent, which is opposed to coercion or 
brute force. Coercion is, in other words, characterized by the absence of consent, and is 
overt or non-subtle. Along these lines, Zeitoun et.al. theorize what they call different 
mechanisms for the contestation of, or production of compliance with a given 
hegemonic or dominant order. 
These mechanisms are organized along the axis mentioned above, and roughly speaking 
involve three different levels: coercive mechanisms are characterized by the use of overt 
force and lacking consent; bargaining mechanisms are characterized by at least the 
appearance of bargaining between the involved parties and are characterized by a mix 
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between overt and subtle power; and ideational or ideological mechanisms are 
characterized by more or less tacit consent and the absence of overt force. 
Below the definition of these mechanisms are quoted from Zeitoun et.al. (2014:2-4): 
Firstly, mechanisms for the production of compliance: 
Coercive compliance-producing mechanisms: […] compliance with the 
order can be assured through pressure created by the use of force or the threat 
of the use of force, e.g. the unilateral construction of infrastructure. Active 
stalling during negotiations is classed under this category, because of the 
very different alternatives available to the stronger and weaker sides in the 
absence of a negotiated agreement […]. Material capacities to create and 
gain access to alternatives (e.g. through more infrastructure of financial 
resources) can also create pressure on the weaker side to consent, without 
any direct or discernible exertion of power.  
Utilitarian compliance-producing mechanisms: are used to encourage 
compliance with the status quo. These are the ‘carrots’ to the ‘stick’ of 
coercive mechanisms. Utilitarian mechanisms can include inducements or 
rewards that bring either political pay-offs, such as recognition and similar 
rewards and alliances for legitimacy-challenged regimes, or financial pay-
offs such as a share of the capital generated by a transboundary water project.  
Normative compliance-producing mechanisms: rely on instilling the 
belief that compliance with the order is right, or a duty, even an obligation. 
The normative basis for this type of compliance is the legitimacy of the 
order, such that compliance is assured “regardless of whether fear of 
punishment for refusal to comply is present, and regardless of calculations 
that may be made about the balance of costs and benefits entailed in 
compliance” (Lustic 2002: 23). Transboundary water treaties, ‘best practice’ 
of transboundary water management, and the operational procedures of 
international financial institutions may be considered examples of normative 
compliance-producing mechanisms active in transboundary water 
interaction. 
Ideological compliance-producing mechanisms rely on unquestioned 
acceptance of the order, independent of the sense of obligation, or rewards 
or pressure on offer. When these mechanisms are effective, not complying 
with the order is unconsciously ruled out. The knee-jerk reactions invoked 
when political issues (such as the sharing of transboundary waters) are 
portrayed as national security issues are an example of ideological 
mechanisms, as are deeply-held facts derived from the construction of 
knowledge and sanctioned discourse […]. 
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Conversely, Zeitoun et.al. define the mechanisms for resistance and counter-
hegemony in the following way: 
Coercive resistance mechanisms: these mechanisms to resist the 
established order rely on compelling one actor involuntarily, by the use of 
force or the threat of the use of force. Examples of such coercion may 
include violence against and sabotage of the hegemonic order, the unilateral 
construction of hydraulic infrastructure (in transboundary waters) – or 
merely a threat to execute any of these.  
Leverage mechanisms of resistance and of counter-hegemony: These 
mechanisms to resist or transform the established order rely on increasing 
and actor’s influence and authority at the local, regional or even global level. 
The approach does not necessarily challenge the legitimacy of the order, but 
works to win ‘the game’ within the rules that have been established under 
the hegemonic setting. Leveraging mechanisms at use in transboundary 
water setting include forming strategic alliances […], launching diplomatic 
efforts, the use of the principles of International Water Law to contest 
existing legal setting, or the mobilization of alternative sources of funding. 
Liberating mechanisms of resistance and of counter-hegemony These 
mechanisms seek to transform the order through direct or indirect 
undermining of the foundations that underpin in. Distinct from coercive 
resistance mechanisms in that they have potential to transform a hegemonic 
order, liberating mechanisms generally challenge the legitimacy of the order 
by offering alternatives, i.e. replacing dominant and sanctioned visions, 
agendas, discourses, realities, knowledge.  
The above demonstrates the emphasis on discourse, ideology and the construction of 
knowledge as determinants of transboundary basin interaction. Accordingly, it is argued 
that a comprehensive and methodologically sound approach to discourse and ideology is 
necessary to fruitful hydro-hegemonic analysis. 
As mentioned, the compatibility between hydro-hegemonic and the social semiotics of 
Hodge & Kress lies in their shared focus on power asymmetry and the duality of 
coercion-consent and power-solidarity. Naturally, an important question in this respect 
concerns the theoretical relation between what Hodge & Kress call power and 
solidarity; and what Zeitoun et.al. refer to as coercion and consent, and respectively 
solidarity and consent as a key to dominance and hegemony. 
Here, Zeitoun et.al. explicitly draw on Gramsci: 
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It is through consent that power over ideas (even at the inter-state level) 
blends with Gramsci’s notion of hegemony. Gramsci’s (2003 [1935]) insight 
into the relations between authorities and those they have authority [sic] 
allowed him to interpret the give-and-take that goes on in exchanges 
between them […]. As control is more readily maintained through a mix of 
force and consent (rather than through force alone), the consent of the 
weaker subject to a hegemonic arrangement is integral to its maintenance. 
(…). (Zeitoun, et al. 2014)  
This quote appears to echo the theoretical perspective of Hodge & Kress. With 
reference to Gramsci, Zeitoun et.al. assert that the most effective form of power is 
power over ideas, whereby the dominated may act according to the wishes of the 
dominant willingly or in some cases without even being aware of it. 
This presupposes, however, that the dominated consent – consciously or not – to the 
ruling ideas. As we have seen above, the hegemony of Egypt in the Blue Nile basin is 
founded on the Nile Water Agreements and the ideas and discourses that support these. 
If Sudan and Ethiopia do not consent to these agreements as the foundation of the basin 
order – as now seems at least partly appears to be happening – this implies a 
contestation of Egyptian ideological power. 
Put differently, Egyptian ideological domination in the Nile Basin rests on the 
identification of other basin countries as members of the Egyptian order. To paraphrase 
Hodge & Kress, the Egyptian ideology must express bonds of solidarity with those it 
seeks to dominate. In the concrete context of the relationship between Egypt and Sudan, 
Egyptian ideological power rests on the ideological point of view that there is social, 
political and geographical cohesion between the two countries that warrants integration 
or alliance. 
By consenting to the Egyptian Nile order, Sudan and Ethiopia have marked solidarity 
with Egypt. Although additional research is called for, this suggests that consent and 
solidarity are compatible concepts. The same seems the case when considering the 
theoretical relation between power in the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress, and 
coercion in hydro-hegemonic. As mentioned in chapter one, Hodge & Kress define 
power in the context of ideology as “hierarchy, control and order”. To Zeitoun et.al., 
coercion as we a have seen involves the overt use of force or threat of the use of force. 
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A Critique of the Concept of Ideology in Hydro-
Hegemonic Theory 
The above is not to suggest that the concept of ideology in hydro-hegemony is a 
complete match with the concept of ideology in the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress. 
An important difference between the two is the way Zeitoun et.al. theorize ideology as 
relating only to subtle or non-coercive mechanisms of power. 
To the extent it is a hegemon in the basin, Egypt has according to Zeitoun et.al. been 
able to rely chiefly on ideological or normative mechanisms for assuring compliance 
with its order in the Nile Basin. It has not, goes the argument, generally needed to resort 
to coercive mechanisms71. 
Gramsci, whose theories hydro-hegemony is founded in, explains the difference 
between coercion and consent with the following analogies: "State and Church; politics 
and morality […], law and freedom; order and self-discipline […]" (Gramsci 1999:387). 
Hodge & Kress, however, make it explicit that they consider ideology to be “coercively 
imposed by dominant groups on behalf of their distinctive interests [my emphasis]” 
(1988:3). In other words, Hodge & Kress contend that the imposition of an ideological 
complex on a group is coercive in that it seeks to force that group to adopt or accept a 
specific world-view. 
From this perspective, both State and Church imply logonomic systems, which explicitly 
regulate social production of meaning in order that it serve the dominant ideological 
complex (Hodge and Kress 1988:4). In other words, Church is not in principle different 
from state, or in the case of GERD, Egypt discussing military action against Ethiopia 
and Egypt sanctioning discourse or authoring expert knowledge are all coercive actions 
in that they impose or seek to impose certain ideological complexes and logonomic 
systems on the other riparians – or more precisely: they all seek to structure the world in 
certain ways which serve Egyptian goals in the basin. 
A concrete example of how ideology from the perspective of Hodge & Kress is coercive 
is the representation of Sudan in Egyptian ideology. Egyptian ideology is quite blunt 
                                                 
71 Athough for example the Egyptian stalling of the Nile Basin Initiative negotiations might according to the above 
definitions be classified as a coercive mechanism. 
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and direct in legitimizing Egyptian control in the basin and in more or less completely 
disregarding Sudanese perspectives. Characterizing this interaction as non-coercive 
because it is a question of ideology and discourse rather than for example military might 
or the stalling of negotiations appears inadequate. 
Furthermore, it is argued that if ideology – as Zeitoun et.al. posit – has the power to 
elicit compliance with the rules a given order, then it follows that ideology has a 
normative function. This is implicitly understood by the social semiotics of Hodge & 
Kress, whereby ideology as we have seen is composed of an ideological complex and a 
logonomic system. The latter explicitly pertaining to “normative mechanisms”, despite 
functioning as part of ideology.  
What this study suggests as a tentative way to broaden and deepen the hydro-hegemonic 
understanding of ideology is to adopt a less compartmentalized view of the role of 
ideology in transboundary river basins. More concretely this would entail not tying 
ideology only to what Zeitoun call “ideological mechanisms”, but rather working 
towards an understanding of ideas and ideals as important also to other forms of power 
and interaction. 
While more research is needed, it is suggested that effective ideology (as in the 
ideological mechanisms theorized by in hydro-hegemonic) should be distinguished from 
ideology as fundamental to the socio-political dimension of transboundary river basin 
interaction. That Egyptian ideology may be faltering as an effective source of Egyptian 
hegemony in the Blue Nile Basin does not, it is argued, mean that more contentious 
ways of asserting Egyptian power are any less ideological – in the sense that they are 
based in ideas of what the basin is, and have concrete goals pertaining to what the basin 
should be. 
In an extreme example from the above discussion, when participants of the televised 
Egyptian meeting for the discussion of GERD suggested military action towards 
Ethiopia72, they presumably did so due to specific reasons pertaining to an ideological 
image of the Nile, and of who should control the it. 
                                                 
72 See footnote 16, page 36. 
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Accordingly, this study suggests as a productive avenue for further research the 
possibility for and utility of a hydro-hegemonic study of ideology based in the 
theoretical-methodological framework of the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress. In the 
first instance, it is suggested that such research be oriented towards the theoretical 
relationship between power-solidarity and coercion-consent, and towards the interaction 
between ideology and the world outside political discourse. 
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5 Conclusion 
This thesis has shown how ideology in Egyptian media discourse legitimizes Egyptian 
dominance in the Blue Nile Basin; and how ideology in Sudanese media discourse in a 
limited way subverts this dominance. Through doing so it has at the same time 
demonstrated the potential of the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress as a 
methodological approach to the study of ideology in the Blue Nile basin. 
The current chapter will summarize the study’s findings, and attempt to provide some 
conclusions. We begin with a summary of the findings related to the Egyptian and 
Sudanese ideologies, followed by a suggestion of the implications of the prescriptive 
concept of solidarity which appears to remain the governing principle of both Egyptian 
and Sudanese ideologies in the Blue Nile Basin. Concluding with a reflection on the 
methodological utility of the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress for the study of 
ideology in the Blue Nile Basin, and a suggestion of avenues for further theoretical and 
empirical research. 
Egypt – ‘A First Among Equals’ 
The Ideological Complex 
In Egyptian ideology, the Blue Nile Basin is represented as characterized by equality 
and the rule of law – all states reportedly have equal rights to benefit from the Nile 
waters and to pursue development, provided they do not harm the development of 
others. What constitutes ‘harm’, and by extension what constitutes a legitimate pursuit 
of development is defined by Egypt – the self-proclaimed leader of the basin due to 
alleged historical and geographical fact. This ideological complex represents Egypt as ‘a 
first among equals’. 
Key to this ideological complex is solidarity: Egyptian discourse goes to great lengths to 
emphasize the cohesion between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan – geographically, 
hydrologically, politically and socially – and the main claim used to denounce both 
Ethiopia and Sudan is that they are not acting in solidarity either with Egypt or with the 
common good of the basin. 
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In the Egyptian discourse, Ethiopia is consistently referred to as brother ‘akh’ – brother 
in the same way one might refer to one’s neighbour as brother – and Sudan is 
consistently referred to as ‘shaqiq’ – or brother from the same mother and father. This 
illustrates both the strong principles of solidarity outlined above, and the fact that the 
relationship between Egypt and Sudan is represented as closer than that of Egypt and 
Ethiopia. 
According to this representation, the basin is by its nature divided into two distinct 
areas: the humid highlands of the South, and the arid lowlands of the North. In Arabic, 
these distinct and opposing units are generally referred to respectively as “duwwal al-
manbaʻ” and “dawlatain al-masab”. “Manbaʻ” refers to the “spring or origin” of the 
river, whereas “Masab” refers to the “outlet or drain” of the river. In this context they 
may be translated as “downstream states” and “upstream states”. 
To the downstream states (‘dawlatain al-masab’) belong the brothers (‘ashiqqa’’) 
Egypt and Northern Sudan, largely represented as an integrated unit, shaped by 
common geography and history. These states are framed as the natural leaders of the 
basin due to their stable climate, the related potential for agriculture and the long history 
of their civilizations. 
First among them is Egypt, the executor of the natural order in the basin and the 
defender of equal rights and the pursuit of mutual development through shared interests. 
Because Egyptian leadership is represented as natural and based in scientific fact, and as 
guaranteeing equal rights to benefit from the Nile, and the pursuit of mutual 
development, its legitimacy is unimpeachable. Any contestation of it could only be 
motivated by politics, in Egyptian ideology represented as opposed to scientific fact 
Solidarity is represented as fundamental to Egyptian ideology and as crucial to Egyptian 
existence. This ideology should be seen as a response to the history and hydrology of 
the basin. Egypt occupies an extremely vulnerable position in the Nile Basin – relying 
almost entirely on water originating outside its border. Moreover, the policies of the 
British colonizers suggest upstream Nile control as a means of control over Egypt is not 
an abstract concept, but a recent experience. 
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The Logonomic System 
Implicit in this ideological complex are two contradictions: firstly, Egyptian dominance 
in a basin ostensibly characterized by equality; and secondly Egypt’s vehement 
opposition to unilateral action on the Nile, despite the foundation of the Egyptian Nile 
order in unilateral action – namely the Nile Water Agreements. 
The Nile Water Agreements are represented as expressions of self-evident rules founded 
on self-evident facts. These rules form the basis of logonomic system of Egyptian 
ideology, which allows it to function despite its inherent contradictions. The most 
fundamental logonomic rules which statements regarding legitimate interaction in the 
Blue Nile Basin must follow have been summarized as the following: 1) the Nile Water 
Agreements are the basis of basin law; 2) this law guarantees Egypt’s historical right to 
its share of the Nile waters; 3) it also guarantees the Egyptian right to veto construction 
on the Nile River in order to protect its water allocation; 4) all other Nile countries have 
equal rights to benefit from the river provided 1)-3) are not interfered with; and 5) the 
goal of basin interaction is mutual development through the pursuit of shared interests, 
understood as the pursuit of the equal rights established in 4). 
The fact the Nile Water Agreements are framed as legal documents, it is argued, may 
obscure the circumstances of their authorship because an important principle of law is 
that it apply equally to all. Thus, it is suggested that despite having been constructed 
unilaterally by Egypt, Great Britain and Sudan primarily to serve Egypt, the claimed 
legal status of Nile Water Agreements is used to represent solidarity through equality. 
These are explicitly taught and enforced by a range of institutions tied to knowledge 
production and the spread of information. Media discourse is in Egypt regulated by the 
state. It is a common occurrence both for the security forces to confiscate publications, 
stop printing and arrest journalists; and for the judicial institutions to sanction legal 
action. There is also a significant degree of self-censorship by journalists and editors. 
Finally, the Egyptian ideology’s emphasis on scientific fact means that questions 
regarding the Blue Nile Basin are framed in terms of right and wrong. Egyptian 
discourse makes a claim to a superior scientific understanding of the basin – refusing to 
recognize knowledge authored by Sudan and Ethiopia due to their allegedly inferior 
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research methods and capabilities. This claim is used to dismiss Ethiopian and Sudanese 
perspectives as insincere, selfish and political. 
Ethiopian and Sudanese Transgression 
According to Egyptian ideology, Ethiopia’s political aim with the construction of 
GERD relates to its ambitions for unilateral control over the Nile, the destabilization of 
the basin and the marginalization of Egypt. Part of the representation of Egyptian 
ideology as based in scientific fact, GERD is asserted as near-universally harmful 
except to the exploitative aims of Ethiopia. Moreover, it is claimed to be poorly 
researched, designed and implemented – putting the entire basin at risk in the case of an 
earthquake or other unforeseen events. 
In constructing it, Ethiopia is represented as coercively having overstepped its 
legitimate rights in the basin. It has allegedly been unmasked a pretender to basin 
dominance, and its reign would most likely be based on blunt force in order to pressure 
its policy through. To this end it is reported to be taking advantage of Sudan, interfering 
in its domestic policy in order to ensure Sudanese support for GERD. 
Sudan is on the other hand framed as weak and unstable - a little brother to Egypt. As 
we already have seen, Sudan and Ethiopia are not represented as equal in Egyptian 
ideology. The Sudanese support for GERD appears to hit closer to home than the 
Ethiopian construction of GERD, as Sudan is chastised more strongly than the former 
for its abandonment or even betrayal of Egypt. 
It is claimed that Sudan is racked by poor governance and is being taken advantage of 
by Ethiopia, either not realizing the damage GERD could cause it and Egypt, or 
ignoring this for the sake of the ruling elite improving their relations with Ethiopia. At 
the most extreme, this is used as an argument for Egyptian intervention in Sudan. 
The Sudanese motivation for the support of GERD reportedly relates to the 
unpopularity of the current government, Ethiopian pressure and the instability of the 
Sudanese state. Issues the Sudanese government allegedly seeks to address through 
increasing its cooperation with Ethiopia – which reportedly plays a key role in domestic 
Sudanese politics most importantly through it hosting the negotiations between Sudan 
84 
 
and the Sudanese opposition, and between Sudan and South Sudan. The Sudanese 
leadership, represented by President Bashir, is chastised for working towards their own 
political gain –  ignoring both scientific fact, and the larger strategic issues related to the 
ongoing shift of power in the basin. 
As a consequence, the representation of Sudan in the Egyptian discourse leaves it in a 
position where it cannot have agency. Citing its weakness, and the incompetence and 
political problems of its government (i.e. Bashir), Sudan can apparently only hold one 
of two positions: either it must be with Ethiopia, in which case it is acting against its 
own interests and therefore must be incompetently governed, exploited and/or 
misunderstanding the situation; or it is with Egypt. There is no room for a middle 
position, which is what Sudanese spokespeople in the Egyptian media argue for. In 
short, there does not in the current Egyptian ideology in the Blue Nile Basin appear to 
be room for a Sudan which contests the Egyptian perspective. 
Sudan – ‘A Middle Party’ 
A Limited Subversion of the Ideology of Egyptian Dominance 
Sudanese ideology paints a different but related picture. In the context of a basin 
allegedly characterized by Egyptian dominance and exploitation, the argument is made 
that the upstream countries (including Sudan) should have greater rights – notably the 
right to construct infrastructure and more freely utilize the Nile waters. 
At the same time, great care is taken to assert continued solidarity with Egypt. 
Throughout the Sudanese discourse, there are repeated claims that Sudan will not agree 
to anything that harms Egypt, and that its support for the construction of GERD is 
contingent on the dam not posing a danger to Egypt or Egyptian water allocations. 
Accordingly, the Sudanese ideological complex is summarized as ‘a middle stance’. 
With this caveat, Sudanese ideology subverts Egyptian dominance by seeking to expose 
Egyptian actions in the basin as hypocritical and based in self-interest, in clear 
contravention of the solidarity used to legitimize dominance in the Egyptian discourse. 
Here, in other words, Egypt is the one cast as exploitative and selfish, and its language 
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of solidarity and familial bonds is sought unmasked as a relatively empty tactic of 
dominance. 
A crucial part of this subversion, the modern history of the Blue Nile Basin is 
represented as the history of Egyptian dominance and exploitation of the upstream 
countries. Egypt’s modern Sudan policy is criticized for lacking any degree of solidarity 
or focus on common interest, betraying a purely strategic approach where Sudan is 
simply a means to the end of continued Egyptian dominance in the basin. 
This limited subversion of Egyptian dominance entails a limited subversion of the 
logonomic system supporting this. In Sudanese ideology, the most fundamental 
logonomic rules which statements regarding legitimate interaction in the Blue Nile 
Basin must follow are: 1) the Nile Water Agreements are not a valid basis for basin law 
due to their colonial origins and over-privileging of Egypt; 2) all Nile countries have 
equal rights to benefit from the river provided no harm is caused to any other Nile 
country; and 3) the goal of basin interaction is mutual development through the pursuit 
of shared interests, understood as the pursuit of the equal rights established in 2). 
Implicit in this, the Sudanese logonomic system is based in a post-colonial reading of 
basin regulation, whereby it is asserted that such regulation should be jointly authored 
by all basin countries, and guarantee all equal rights to benefit from the river. At the 
same time, the limitations to this subversion are clear, as the last two rules are shared 
with the Egyptian logonomic system. Furthermore, aside from rights to construction of 
infrastructure, it is not sufficiently specified how ‘equal rights’ in Sudanese ideology 
differs from ‘equal rights’ in Egyptian ideology. These limitations are further discussed 
below. 
GERD as Legitimate Sudanese Interest 
GERD is in Sudanese ideology represented as a concrete expression of what this new 
idea of equal rights in the basin would entail: namely a contestation of the Egyptian veto 
on construction in the basin, and a reassessment of the Nile Water Agreements as the 
source of basin-regulation. In other words, the Sudanese support for GERD is framed as 
a subversion of the institutions at the heart of Egyptian dominance; as well as a 
statement of Sudanese pragmatism, agency and new-found position as a middle party – 
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supporting the rights of the upstream countries to construct on and benefit from the 
Nile, while seeking to avoid harm to Egypt. 
While Sudanese support for GERD is seen by Egypt as political posturing for the 
benefit of Ethiopia-Sudanese relations, the ideological claim in Sudanese discourse is 
that given the geographic location of Sudan and the hydrology of the Blue Nile, it 
simply makes no sense for Sudan not to support GERD due to its considerable benefits 
for the country. The most important benefits are that the dam will protect Sudanese 
dams from silt; it will protect Sudan from floods; and it will provide Sudan with much 
needed electricity. 
In a clear subversion of Egyptian ideology, these benefits are largely treated as an 
established fact in Sudanese discourse, while any risks involved in the dam’s 
construction are played down. In an expression of the prominent role of solidarity also 
in Sudanese ideology, GERD is represented as a catalyst for change and increased 
cooperation in the entire basin. Part of this, it is represented as beneficial also to Egypt – 
a manifestation of shared interests for all basin countries. 
Like the threats to Egypt from upstream water control, the benefits that may be reaped 
from GERD are not abstract concepts. Likewise, it is widely considered that the Nile 
Water Agreements are biased towards Egypt. Accordingly, the Sudanese ideology 
should be seen as a response to the history and hydrology of the Blue Nile Basin. 
The Contradiction of a Sudanese Middle Position and the 
Failure to Acknowledge Conflicting Interests 
The main argument made in Sudanese discourse is for a change in Sudanese regional 
policy, that it must become more pragmatic in its interactions with other Nile countries 
and work for its own interests, rather than supporting Egypt by default. In short, it must 
move from being Egypt’s little brother to becoming an agent in its own right. 
At the same time, in a somewhat paradoxical turn of events, this new Sudanese position 
is expressed through a discourse which casts Sudan as ‘a middle party’ or even as 
neutral. Sudan, it is argued, is geographically situated between Egypt and Ethiopia, and 
so its regional policy should acknowledge this and work for a closer relationship with 
87 
 
Ethiopia, while maintaining solidarity both with Egypt and as the governing principle of 
the basin. This study argues that there is a clear contradiction between the stated goal of 
increased Sudanese pragmatism and the adoption of a so-called ‘middle position’. 
Relatedly, the Sudanese subversion of Egyptian dominance is limited in that it primarily 
targets the alleged hypocrisy of Egyptian solidarity and the institutions of Egyptian 
dominance – most notably the Nile Water Agreements and the Egyptian construction 
and regulation of knowledge. The prescriptive idea of solidarity as a normative way of 
identifying patterns of cooperation which as a rule benefit all and harm no one is left 
more or less intact, merely with the addition of post-colonial principles as a means of 
contesting the Egyptian definition of what constitutes ‘harm’, ‘equal rights’ and 
accordingly ‘legitimate development’. 
It seems that while the apparent goal of the Sudanese ideology is the subversion of 
Egyptian dominance, the Sudanese discourse does not go far enough in its subversion of 
the Egyptian logonomic system. While it contests the institutions through which this 
functions, it fails to address the idea of solidarity and common interests underlying the 
logonomic system – and by extension the idea that there is no inherent conflict of 
interests in the Blue Nile basin. The result appears to be a situation where both parties 
simply claim that their interests are legitimate shared interests, and their opponents’ are 
motivated by selfishness, power hunger and/or a misunderstanding of the situation. 
In this context, the current logonomic system serves the interests of Egypt, which as the 
long-time hegemon of the basin has been able to label its own interests as shared 
interests. If prescriptive solidarity remains at the heart of ideology in the basin, the 
question is whether Sudan has the resources and support to gain regional and 
international acceptance for its own definition of ‘mutual interests’ and ‘equal rights’. 
‘Shared Interests’ as an Impediment to Effective 
Interaction in the Blue Nile Basin 
Both Egyptian and Sudanese ideologies hinge on a prescriptive conception of solidarity 
as the governing principle of basin-interaction. Both are founded in the assumption that 
there exists an ideal solution to conflict in the basin – in this case the conflict 
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surrounding the construction of GERD – which benefits all basin countries and harms 
no one. 
Among countries as geographically and hydrologically diverse as the Blue Nile Basin 
countries, such an ideal solution appears utopic. In the case of GERD it certainly seems 
that Sudan and Ethiopia stand to benefit more than Egypt. Whatever the case may be, it 
is a fact that Egypt is rather reluctant to accept the dam’s construction, and that there are 
clear benefits to be reaped for Sudan. 
On the basis of its findings, this study proposes that the idea of ‘shared interests’ is an 
impediment to effective and sustainable basin interaction. Effective dialogue between 
the countries of the Blue Nile seems unlikely if there is little or no acknowledgment of 
conflicting interests as a natural consequence of the different hydrological, 
geographical, political and social characteristics of the different states. 
The burning question is whether there are more useful ways of dealing with 
disagreement than glossing over it by referring to different ideas of purported ‘shared 
interests’. 
Reflections on the Social Semiotics of Hodge & 
Kress as a Methodological Approach to Ideology 
in the Blue Nile Basin 
It has been asserted above that this thesis demonstrates the utility of the social semiotics 
of Hodge & Kress for the study of ideology in the Blue Nile Basin. This section 
expands on that assertion, reflecting on the strengths and potential weaknesses of this 
theoretical-methodological approach. 
In applying the analytical framework of the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress to the 
study of ideology in the Blue Nile Basin, there are arguably two main and related 
theoretical-methodological dangers: confirmation bias, and the strong leaning of social 
semiotics towards a constructivist and language-centric understanding of the world. 
Beginning with confirmation bias, a risk with the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress, as 
with any method, is that what is observed is as much a product of the theoretical-
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methodological approach used as it is empirically founded. In other words, the 
analytical framework applied to the empirical data may condition what is observed, and 
how this is interpreted. In the context of this study, the clearest danger is that the 
application of the current analytical framework may over-privilege the role of ideology 
in basin dominance; as well as the role of solidarity as a determinant of such 
dominance.  
As discussed in chapter one, the significance of ideology to basin dominance is based 
on the assumption that socio-political interaction in the Blue Nile Basin is governed not 
only by scientific fact, but also by ideas representing the world in specific ways; and by 
ideals specifying goals for such interaction. This perspective is corroborated both by 
Zeitoun et.al (2014), and by Tvedt – who in his books “The River Nile in the Age of the 
British” (2006) and “The Nile: The River of History" (2012) emphasizes the role of 
ideas and political theory to how a river is conceptualized and interacted with. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the foundation of ideology in the Blue Nile Basin in both 
power and solidarity is empirically supported. The significance of solidarity is indicated 
by the explicit discourse of shared interests, and of geographical, social and political 
cohesion – and even integration – in both Egyptian and Sudanese newspapers. Power 
and solidarity as twin determinants of dominance or hegemony is also supported by 
Zeitoun et.al., who as we have seen indicate hegemony in the basin is reliant on both 
coercion and consent. 
As for the understanding of ideology as expressed through an ideological complex, it is 
similarly argued that this closely corresponds with empirical findings. While the 
theoretical-methodological framework of Hodge & Kress greatly facilitates the 
observation and interpretation of these, it is argued that the contradictions implicit in the 
bonds of power and solidarity projected by Egyptian and Sudanese ideologies would be 
clear also in lieu of this methodological approach. 
The constraints on the messages that can be produced and received referred to as the 
logonomic system also fits well in the Egyptian and Sudanese discourses. Both 
Sudanese and the Egyptian media are regulated by the respective governments – and as 
we have seen the respective discourses clearly criticize messages that do not follow 
concrete ideological rules. 
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Given the strong bias of social semiotics towards a highly constructivist interpretation 
of reality and orientation to language above all else as the determinant of this reality, the 
second main danger from the use of the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress is, so to 
speak, taking the linguistic turn too far. In other words, overemphasizing language as a 
determinant of reality. 
This also compounds the risk of confirmation bias to the extent that researcher, instead 
of applying the theoretical-methodological framework to the empirical data in order to 
explain this data, applies the empirical data to the theoretical-methodological approach 
– in doing so more or less constructing a reality of his own devising. 
Due to the constructivist bias of social semiotics, it is of crucial importance that 
ideology be understood as directly related to the physical world, and as conditioned by 
this world in concrete ways. A risk in using social semiotics is that this connection is 
obscured or neglected, and that the study of ideology in international river basins is 
reduced to the study of language – effectively rendering such a study irrelevant. 
It is partly for this reason it has been suggested that the social semiotics of Hodge & 
Kress as an approach to the study of ideology in international river basins be tied to 
hydro-hegemony, which, despite its flaws, is valuable in its orientation towards an inter-
disciplinary study of interaction in international river basins – conditioned by discourse 
and ideology, but not a product of these. 
The strength of the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress lies in successfully combining 
these empirical insights into a functional and coherent model of ideology in the Blue 
Nile Basin. With the risks in mind, it is argued that social semiotics provides a useful 
theoretical framework for the prudent researcher to make sense of the social or 
ideological dimension of the Blue Nile Basin, understood as an extension of the 
physical or hydrological dimension, both regarded from a diachronic perspective.  
More specifically, this strength lies in the framework’s potential to capture ideology in 
the Blue Nile Basin as a functional socio-political construct with explicit links both to 
history, and to the physical world. Through the understanding of messages as linking 
both signifiers and signifieds; and producers and recipients, social semiotics allows for 
an understanding of ideology as a concrete image of the world, conditioned by socio-
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political interaction between agents with asymmetric resources, and concrete points of 
view and goals. 
Ideology and Hydro-Hegemony 
While hydro-hegemony theorizes the ways in which ideology and discourse relate to 
larger power structures in transboundary river basins, it does not feature a theoretical-
methodological framework for the study of these concepts in their own right. A 
symptom of this shortcoming, it is argued, is an overly compartmentalized 
understanding of the role and nature of ideology, whereby their impact is considered to 
be limited to more or less effective so-called subtle mechanisms. 
Based on its findings, this study proposes the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress as a 
potentially promising theoretical-methodological foundation for deepening and 
broadening the hydro-hegemonic understanding of ideology. Conceptualizing it as 
fundamental to socio-political interaction in transboundary river basins, pertaining also 
to non-subtle mechanisms. 
A combination of the two would likely be aided by the fact that they are conceptually 
related – both focusing on power asymmetry and the duality of power-solidarity and 
coercion-consent. Finally, such a combination would be potentially beneficial also with 
the aim of addressing the limitations of the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress, 
discussed in the previous section. 
Suggested Avenues for Further Research 
This study indicates several avenues for further research related to ideology and its role 
in international river basin interaction. To build on the findings of this thesis and at the 
same time address its limitations, more research should be carried out into the Ethiopian 
ideology in the Blue Nile basin, as well as into non-state ideologies within the different 
Blue Nile countries. This research could probably be expanded to include also the other 
tributaries of the Nile river. 
More comprehensive insight is needed into the nature and role of ideology in Nile basin 
interaction – especially into how ideology relates to the world outside discourse. For 
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this reason, it is proposed that the social semiotics of Hodge & Kress be married to 
hydro-hegemony. Should it prove possible to combine these frameworks in a fruitful 
way, more research would be called for into the nature and role of ideology also in other 
river basins. 
Finally, additional historical research is called for. The work of Tvedt provides a useful 
starting point since it reconstructs British colonial water projects, water plans and hydro 
strategies in great detail, however it could be expanded upon to write a comparative 
intellectual history of the Nile focusing more systematically on the various perspectives 
of the states and peoples in the basin. A considerable task, to be sure, but an important 
one with the goal of illuminating the river from different angles. 
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